The Effects of Anger and Anger Regulation on Negotiation

Thomas F. Denson & Emma C. Fabiansson
University of New South Wales

Correspondence regarding this chapter should be addressed to:

Dr. Tom Denson (t.denson@unsw.edu.au) or Emma C. Fabiansson
(efabiansson@psy.unsw.edu.au)
University of New South Wales
School of Psychology
Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
Phone: +61 2 93851305
Fax: +61 2 93853641

Negotiation is a primary method of resolving social and economic conflict. Negotiations can also evoke a range of negative emotions. Although much prior research has downplayed or ignored the importance of emotions, recent theoretical functionalist approaches acknowledge the consequences emotions can have on negotiations (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Shapiro, 2002; Morris & Keltner, 2000). This review focuses on the role that anger plays in negotiations. Anger is important to regulate because it can lead to an escalation of conflict (Allred et al., 1997). We first explore why anger regulation is important despite the sometimes positive effects of expressing anger. Next we examine the effectiveness of different emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal, rumination, and distraction and apply these to the negotiation context. We then present the results from two experiments using emotion regulation to explore what impact these anger regulation strategies have on self-reported emotion and on aggressive behavior in negotiations. Finally, we discuss an additional two experiments examining self-disclosure in negotiations to illustrate how self-disclosure can be used to reduce altruistic punishment in negotiation conditions characterized by mild anger.

Expressing Anger Is a Limited But at Times Effective Strategy

Whether a negotiator simply expresses or experiences anger can result in very different negotiation outcomes. Anger can be examined from an <u>intra</u>personal perspective (i.e., felt anger) or an <u>inter</u>personal perspective (i.e., the effects anger expression on others; Van Kleef et al., 2008). Generally, intrapersonal anger in negotiations is thought to result in poorer negotiation outcomes than interpersonal anger (Van Kleef et al., 2008). For example, intrapersonal anger can produce stalemates, conflict, and economically irrational behavior (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Allred et al., 1997; Liu, 2008). By contrast, expressing anger can result in financial gain by encouraging opponents to make concessions. For example, a salesperson may be likely to give in

to an angry customer demanding a discount in order to avoid further escalation of conflict and minimize disruption to other customers.

Despite these sometimes positive benefits, strategically using anger to obtain demands is a limited short-term strategy. For example, anger can negatively impact relationship quality and make people less willing to negotiate again in the future (Allred et al., 1997). Over time counterparts may habituate to anger expressions and they may no longer be effective (Tiedens, 2001). For example, an angry outburst may be effective the first time; however, the second time one tries this strategy, the other negotiator may resist their demands. Furthermore, over time an angry negotiator may develop an argumentative reputation which could negatively influence subsequent negotiations. Therefore, expressing anger is doubtful as an effective long-term strategy and may only be effective in single instances of negotiation. However, even during one-time negotiations among strangers, research suggests that expressing anger requires very specific conditions to be effective. These variables include how, when, who, and where the anger is expressed. To quote Aristotle "*Anyone can become angry. That is easy. But to be angry with the right person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose and in the right way - that is not easy.*"

How Anger is Expressed

Anger can be expressed in a number of different ways. Gibson, Schweitzer, Callister, and Gray (2009) examined which characteristics are needed for expressing anger to result in constructive negotiation outcomes in organizational settings. Anger episodes from a variety of organizations were analyzed and the consequences of these episodes were examined by analyzing the respondent's perceived impact of the episode on outcomes at the individual and organizational level. The authors also examined the effect of anger expression on the relationship

3

between the parties involved in the event. Positive outcomes were more likely if the anger episodes were low in intensity, expressed verbally rather than physically and displayed in organizations where expressing anger is considered the norm. However, expressing low intensity anger is difficult, requires control, and if displayed incorrectly may result in conflict escalation or stalemate (Gibson et al., 2009). Therefore, both how anger is expressed and the context in which it is expressed are important determinants of its effectiveness.

When Anger is Expressed

The effectiveness of expressing anger may also depend on when in the negotiation anger is expressed (e.g., at the beginning of the negotiation, during the positioning phase, during problem solving, or at the end of the negotiation; Morris & Keltner, 2000). The positioning stage is when one or both negotiators expresses to their partner their negotiation stance, for example, what points they would be willing to concede and refuse to compromise. Anger expressed during the positioning stage may result in gaining an upper hand through coercive pressure. Anger expressed during a bargaining stage may signal dissatisfaction with the offer and encourage their counterpart to offer a more satisfactory offer. However, negative effects may occur when anger is expressed during other stages. For example, anger expressed during the initial stages of the negotiation may produce a stalemate or unwillingness to negotiate in the first place. A display of anger may result in a concession; however, one's counterpart may instead respond angrily and adopt a competitive negotiation stance resulting in escalated conflict and negotiation breakdown (Liu, 2008).

Who Expresses Anger

Whether anger is an effective strategy for claiming value also depends on who expresses anger. The moderating effects of power, gender, and status have been investigated in this regard. Individuals in a high power position are more likely to gain from expressing anger when they are paired with a low power opponent with a limited number of alternatives (Friedman et al., 2004; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). For example, low power participants who had poor alternatives to choose from read either stories with an opponent that expressed anger or no anger. Participants who read the stories containing an angry opponent conceded more than participants who read a scenario without anger (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). Similarly, Van Kleef and Côté (2007) observed that when participants possessed a limited number of options to choose from and their fictitious opponent expressed anger using written statements such as "*This offer makes me really angry. I expect a better offer*", participants demanded less from angry opponents than a non-emotional negotiator. Participants tend to concede more to angry opponents because the expressed anger is thought to signal that opponents have higher demands (Van Kleef et al., 2004; Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008).

Expressing anger can also be used to exert the illusion of power and competence. In a series of experiments, Tiedens (2001) illustrated that anger expressions influence whether people confer or bestow status to others. In study 3 co-workers who rated their colleagues as highly likely to display anger tended to also be conferred more status including higher salaries and likelihood of a promotion. However, additional research reveals that the association between anger and status is different for men and women (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008). In contrast to an angry professional man, professional women who expressed anger were conferred lower status regardless of their actual status (CEO or assistant trainee). Women were allocated lower wages,

status, and perceived as less competent than unemotional women or angry men. The extent to which women were conferred a lower status depended on whether the anger was attributed as due to internal characteristics (e.g. personality) or external characteristics (e.g. the situation). When external attributions were provided for expressions of anger in professional women they were awarded higher status than women without an external attribution but not higher status than non-emotional women. Therefore, the advantages associated with expressing anger do not extend to everyone and the effectiveness of expressing anger is constrained by variables including gender.

Where Anger is Expressed

The effectiveness of expressing anger also depends on where it is expressed. Display rules dictate how acceptable expressing anger in the workplace is and organizational culture partially determines which emotions are considered desirable to display (Morris & Feldman, 1996; Barsade & Gibson, 2007; Gibson, et al., 2009). For example, in customer service-based occupations such as airlines, telephone services, and healthcare, expressing anger is discouraged (Morris, & Feldman, 1996; Barsade & Gibson, 2007), suggesting that individuals in these occupations are typically effective at regulating anger displays. By contrast, some occupations (e.g., ice hockey player, boxer, protestor, opposition politician, radio shock jock) encourage the expression of anger. Thus, organizational norms for expressing anger can determine whether expressing anger has beneficial or detrimental consequences (Gibson et al., 2009). Collectively, the limitations associated with expressing anger illustrate that expressing anger to create gains is constrained by numerous boundary conditions, suggesting that more often than not expressing anger is likely to be ineffective or even detrimental in a many contexts.

Why is Regulating Anger Necessary and How Can Anger be Regulated?

Studies examining the expression of anger have typically investigated the phenomenon from the perspective of the receiver rather than examining the bidirectional effects of the sender and receiver on anger experience. Computer simulations of negotiations are often used to examine these variables, which manipulate anger through the use of written comments which are used to communicate anger to the participant during the deal-making stages of the negotiation (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007; Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008). Although many of these studies illustrate that expressing anger results in better individual negotiation outcomes it does not take into consideration the impact that expressing anger may have on the sender. For example, the peripheral feedback effect (formerly known as the facial feedback hypothesis) suggests that expressing emotions can lead to experiencing emotions (Laird, 1984). If expressing anger results in experiencing anger, then the impact of expressing anger may have the same detrimental consequences associated with studies of intrapersonal anger in negotiations.

Together, the literature reviewed above suggests that regulating anger during negotiations might prove efficacious. Previous recommendations for reducing anger have included strategies such as removing oneself from the conflict or venting anger (Fisher & Ury, 1991). However, avoiding or leaving the situation may be impractical and does nothing to resolve the issue. Methods such as venting anger tend to increase rather than decrease aggression (Bushman, 2002; Bushman, Baumeister, & Strack, 1999; Brown, Westbrook, & Challagalla, 2005). Instead, there are a number of emotion regulation strategies that are available and these differ in terms of their effectiveness. Emotion regulation can be defined as *"the processes by which individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions"* (Gross, 1998b, p. 275). There are two general classes of emotion regulation strategies: antecedent-focused and response-focused.

Cognitive reappraisal is a widely studied example of an antecedent-focused strategy. Reappraisal involves interpreting an anger-eliciting event by adopting a neutral or objective perspective in order to reduce the emotional impact of the event (Ray et al., 2008). For example, instead of fixating on what went wrong in a negotiation reappraisal may involve focusing on future changes that can be made to improve subsequent negotiations. As reappraisal is effortful and involves cognitive change reappraisal has also been labeled a 'deep acting strategy' (Grandey, 2000). Reappraisal works best when it is applied before the full onset of the emotional response (Gross, 1998a) and should therefore be most effective when engaged in prior to negotiation.

One response-focused strategy that has been investigated within the context of anger is rumination. Rumination involves focusing on one's emotions and feelings without constructive problem solving (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). For instance, this may include dwelling on the inflexibility of one's negotiation partner and their reluctance to yield in a negotiation rather than focusing on alternative ways of creating value. Rumination also maintains anger and increases aggression (Bushman, Bonacci, Pedersen, Vasquez, & Miller, 2005; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). There are several different types of rumination. Analytical rumination involves thinking about why an anger provocation occurred and the consequences of this event (Wimalaweera & Moulds, 2008). Experiential rumination is a type of processing that focuses on current and concrete experiences, for example, how you currently feel (Watkins & Teasdale, 2008).

Other examples of response-focused strategies include faking and suppressing emotions. These strategies tend not to produce cognitive change, but instead focus on masking felt emotions (Grandey, 2000). Using a call center simulation with a hostile customer, Goldberg and

Grandey (2007) found that more errors occurred when placing orders when response-focused strategies were used than when antecedent-focused strategies were used. Emotion regulation not only influences how we experience emotions but can also negatively impact job performance. Response-focused strategies such as rumination tend to be less effective in reducing anger and aggressive behavior because they are often associated with the depletion of mental resources whereas antecedent-focused strategies such as reappraisal tend not to result in depletion when initiated prior to the full emotional response (Grandey, Fisk, & Steiner, 2005; Goldberg & Grandey, 2007; Denson, 2009).

Mental distraction is generally used as a control condition. However, distraction can be conceptualized as an emotion regulation strategy in its own right. Instead of focusing on feelings, distraction involves drawing attention to neutral or positive stimuli unrelated to the anger-inducing event (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Distraction is more effective than rumination in reducing anger and aggression (Bushman, 2002; Bushman et al., 2005; Denson, White, & Warburton, 2009; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). For instance, Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) experimentally manipulated rumination and distraction and found that distraction decreased anger (experiment 3) or had no impact on self-reported anger in comparison to rumination (experiment 1). Furthermore, participants who engaged in distraction wrote less angry stories in contrast to participants in the rumination condition.

There are a number of additional variables that influence what emotion regulation strategy is used. For example, how stress is appraised can impact whether one engages in adaptive or maladaptive emotion regulation strategies (Grandey, Dickter, & Sin, 2004). Grandey et al. (2004) examined how call center employees appraised angry customers and what emotion regulation strategies individuals used. Employees recalled a recent event in which a customer

was aggressive, rated the level of stress and the emotion regulation strategy they used. Venting or surface acting strategies were more likely to be used when employees appraised the customer as threatening. Engaging in cognitive reframing or deep acting strategies such as perspective-taking was more likely when stress appraisals were low. Another factor which influences the type emotion regulation strategy used is the level of control individuals possess within their occupation.

Only a few studies have specifically examined the effectiveness of reappraisal as an anger regulation strategy (Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & Gross, 2007; Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross 2008; Denson, Moulds, & Grisham, 2009). Mauss et al. (2007) examined whether individual differences in reappraisal were related to self-reported anger and cardiovascular responses. The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire was used to classify high and low reappraisers. Participants were provoked using a counting backwards task with false feedback. High reappraisers displayed more adaptive cardiovascular responses and less self-reported anger in contrast to low reappraisers. However, this experiment relied on pre-existing differences in reappraisal and does not distinguish whether generally inducing reappraisal would be associated with the same benefits or whether reappraisal training would be effective for individuals who tend not to naturally reappraise.

By contrast, Ray et al. (2008) induced reappraisal and rumination by using guided instructions. For example, when participants in the reappraisal condition recalled an angry episode they were instructed to think about the event as if they were an objective observer. Reappraisal was associated with less anger and decreased physiological responding in comparison to rumination (Ray et al., 2008). Collectively these results illustrate the benefits of reappraisal in comparison to other emotion regulation strategies.

Denson et al. (2009) examined the effectiveness of different anger regulation strategies in response to recalling an angry memory. Participants were allocated to one of four conditions: cognitive reappraisal, analytical rumination, distraction and a no-instruction control condition in which they wrote about an anger-inducing autobiographical event for 20 minutes. As predicted, rumination was associated with maintenance of self-reported anger, whereas the other conditions decreased anger. Reappraisal was the most effective of the four strategies for reducing anger among individuals high in anger-related traits. To further examine the cognitive processes underlying the emotion regulation strategies, a quantitative content analysis of the written responses from the writing task were analyzed using the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count program (Pennebaker, Chung, Ireland, Gonzales, & Booth, 2007). Participants who reappraised used more future tense and positive words, whereas participants in the rumination condition adopted more past tense and greater negative emotion words. These results converge with other studies examining anger regulation (Mauss et al., 2007; Ray et al., 2008).

Neural Evidence for Emotion Regulation During Negotiation

To our knowledge emotion regulation strategies have not yet been systematically investigated within the context of negotiations. Effective anger regulation might help reduce the negative emotional experience and behavioral consequences associated with experiencing anger when negotiating. There is evidence to suggest that anger regulation may be especially beneficial in situations where accepting a poor offer is objectively better than rejecting a poor offer. However, accepting a poor offer is particularly difficult to do when angry as anger produces a desire to punish unfair negotiation partners (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). Pillutla and Murnighan (1996) found that the rejection of low offers in an economic bargaining game was not strictly due

to unfairness of the offer but rather the insulting connotations associated with accepting the poor offer such as the threat to participants' self-worth.

Evidence for the economic benefit of regulating anger comes from two recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using the Ultimatum Game (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008). In the Ultimatum Game, one player chooses how to divide a monetary amount (typically $10) between themselves and another player. The second player chooses whether to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, the money is divided between the two participants. However, if the proposal is rejected then both participants receive nothing (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). Therefore, the latter player has the possibility of punishing their opponent for choosing to divide the money unfairly but at the same time suffers a cost. This type of behavior is known as *altruistic punishment* because one chooses to punish at a personal cost (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). In the context of the Ultimatum Game, it is more economically rational to accept an offer regardless of how low the offer is. This is because accepting a small amount is objectively better than rejecting the offer and receiving nothing.

Sanfey et al. (2003) and Tabibnia et al. (2008) illustrate that receiving unfair offers such as $1 and $2 of $10 is associated with increased activity in the anterior insula, a region implicated in negative emotional experiences including anger and rumination (Denson, Pedersen, Ronquillo, & Nandy, 2009). Accepting unfair offers requires the ability to regulate negative emotions. The ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) has been implicated in emotion regulation (Lieberman, 2007). Accordingly, accepting more unfair offers was associated with increased activity in the right VLPFC and decreased activity in the anterior insula. Similarly, adults with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) which is associated with emotion regulation and social functioning are more likely to reject unfair offers in the Ultimatum

Game than matched controls without VMPFC damage (Koenigs & Tranel, 2007). These findings converge on the notion that emotion regulation is important in promoting rational thinking and the avoidance of aggressive retaliation during bargaining.

Emotion Regulation in Negotiations

Fabiansson and Denson (2009) examined whether regulating anger using reappraisal would not only decrease self-reported anger but also improve negotiation performance. Participants in the reappraisal condition were told prior to the speech task that their partner was in a bit of a bad mood, and that if they do appear to be in a bad mood not to take it personally. This timing was important as theoretically reappraisal should occur before the full onset of an emotional response in order to change the experience of the emotion (Gross, 1998a). Indeed, late reappraisal is more effortful than early reappraisal and late reappraisal was less effective in reducing a sad mood induced by a film than late distraction (Sheppes & Meiran, 2007).

Participants engaged in a speech task called "unilink" with a confederate via webcam and spoke about personal topics such as their life goals. Following this, participants were provoked with insulting feedback stating that their speech was of poor quality for a university student and that listening to their speech was a waste of time. Participants were led to believe that this was sent from their speech partner. Following this, participants reappraised, ruminated or engaged in distraction for 20-minutes. Participants who reappraised were given the following instructions: "Describe your experience of the unilink task in a way that makes you adopt a neutral attitude". Participants in the rumination condition were asked to "Write about the feelings you have about the other people you have encountered in the study". Instructions in the distraction condition consisted of emotionally neutral items similar to Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998; e.g., "Write about the layout of the aisles at your local supermarket").

13

Following the emotion regulation induction, participants played the Ultimatum Game with three bogus participants. These negotiation counterparts consisted of the speech task participant from before and two other participants not previously encountered. First, participants proposed an offer to all three counterparts prior to beginning the game. Second, participants played the role of the responder and received multiple offers from these participants. Half of the offers were fair (e.g. $5, $4) and the other half were unfair (e.g. $1, $2). Participants decided whether to accept or reject these offers. On each trial participants saw a picture of their counterpart (as in Sanfey et al., 2003). The two players not encountered before and the insulting opponent gave exactly the same offers so that these could be compared. Next participants rated their mood at the beginning of the study, post feedback, during the writing and negotiation task, and at the conclusion of the experiment. Participants also rated their opponents on a variety of negotiation-relevant traits (e.g., trustworthy, competitive).

As expected, there were no significant differences in self-reported anger at baseline between the three conditions. Manipulation checks showed that participants in the rumination condition felt emotional more often and more strongly during the writing task than participants in the other conditions. In addition, participants in the reappraisal condition reflected more on the positive features of the speech task and thought about it from an objective perspective in comparison to the remaining conditions.

Importantly, reappraisal was associated with the most adaptive emotional response (Figure 1). Early reappraisal was used in this experiment and the results display that participants who reappraised were less impacted by the initial insult and sustained lower levels of anger throughout the experiment. Specifically, following the insulting feedback, all conditions reported increased anger; however, reappraisal was associated with the smallest increase in anger. During

the writing task, both reappraisal and distraction were associated with a decrease in anger. Interestingly, during the negotiation task the distraction condition increased in anger. Reappraisal was associated with less anger in comparison to the distraction and rumination conditions during the negotiation phase. Similarly, at the conclusion of the experiment reappraisal was associated with significantly less anger in comparison to the distraction and rumination conditions.

These findings illustrate the effectiveness of reappraisal and distraction for reducing anger within a negotiation context. Furthermore, our results suggest that distraction might serve as a "quick fix" for reducing anger, but its effects do not last. Once the negotiation began participants in the distraction condition became angry again. This is presumably because distraction does not facilitate effective processing of the anger-inducing event as does reappraisal. Indeed, participants in the reappraisal and rumination conditions thought about their speech task opponent and the provocation during the writing task in adaptive and maladaptive manners, respectively. By contrast, participants in the distraction condition thought about topics entirely unrelated to the speech task. Thus, when participants in the distraction condition encountered their speech counterpart again in the negotiation task, this may have reminded them of the initial provocation and thereby resulted in an increased sense of anger at seeing their counterpart's picture.

Unfortunately, the effects of the emotion regulation manipulations on the negotiation outcomes were less effective than their effects on angry mood. As can be expected, participants proposed fairer offers and accepted a greater number of offers from the two opponents not encountered before. This is not surprising given that these two opponents did not insult the participant previously. For the positive negotiation relevant traits (e.g., cooperative), participants in the distraction condition rated their speech task opponent more negatively than both the

rumination and reappraisal conditions. One possibility is that the desire to retaliate may have been too strong or that tit-for-tat norms and fairness norms demanded retaliation (Axelrod, 1984; Gouldner, 1960).

Can Self-disclosure Facilitate Effective Anger Regulation?

In another two experiments we sought to induce anger regulation indirectly through self-disclosure. People regularly share or self-disclose personal information with other people. Written and verbal self-disclosure has been found to reduce negative emotions, improve well-being and even decreases visits to the doctor (Frattaroli, 2006; Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1988). Self-disclosing may help individuals process troubling information, make problems more concrete, and result in greater insight and understanding (Pennebaker et al., 1990; Pennebaker, 1993). Relevent to our interests, briefly disclosing personal information prior to negotiating can result in improved negotiation outcomes relative to not self-disclosing (Collins & Miller, 1994; Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, & Morris, 1999; Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, & Thompson, 2002). Indeed, self-disclosure promotes cooperation, liking, better financial outcomes, and a more positive impression of the negotiation process.

Fabiansson and Denson (2009) conducted two studies investigating the effect of self-disclosure paired with ruthless bargaining (experiment 1) and rude behavior (experiment 2). Self-disclosure may reduce the consequences of experiencing anger by decreasing the tendency to engage in conflict or punish others. For example, an individual may be more likely to tolerate being provoked by someone they have self-disclosed with to preserve the relationship than when they are provoked by a complete stranger. We tested theses possibilities within the negotiation context of the Ultimatum Game.

16

In experiment 1, participants in the self-disclosure condition engaged in a brief speech task with a confederate via webcam. Participants disclosed mildly personal information such as describing their family and where they see themselves in five years time. The control and no self-disclosure conditions did not engage in self-disclosure but briefly saw their negotiation counterpart for 20-seconds in order to "set up the negotiation task". Following this, participants played the responder role in the Ultimatum Game and participants in the no self-disclosure and self-disclosure conditions received a series of unfair offers ($1, $2 out of $10) and an insult supposedly from their confederate counterpart: *"I know you'd like more, but that's the way it goes. Take it or leave it!"* (following Kravitz & Gunto, 1992). Participants in the control condition received a series of fair offers (e.g., $5) and a neutral comment. Self-reported mood was measured at the beginning of the experiment, following the webcam task, and after the negotiation task. In addition, negotiation-relevant traits were collected to examine how participants perceived their counterpart.

Results showed that participants in the self-disclosure condition experienced the greatest degree of anger; however, they engaged in less altruistic punishment as they accepted more unfair offers than participants in the no self-disclosure and control conditions. It is possible that self-disclosure may have increased rapport; thus, participants in the self-disclosure condition were more likely to accept offers to preserve the relationship despite the ruthless bargaining displayed by their opponents. Despite experiencing greater anger, participants who self-disclosed were more motivated to regulate their aggressive urges than participants in the no disclosure condition. Therefore, self-disclosure may be another alternative method to reduce retaliation in negotiations. However, self-disclosure as a strategy is limited as based on the results of this experiment it does not improve mood in the same way that reappraisal does. Participants in the

self-disclosure condition however, did not rate their opponent more positively on negotiation-relevant traits and chose to make similar unfair offers in return when they were the proposer at the end of the negotiation game, which is consistent with the tit-for-tat behavior (Axelrod, 1984; Gouldner, 1960). Admittedly, had participants proposed at the beginning of the negotiation task different results may have occurred.

In order to determine the boundary conditions of self-disclosure, experiment 2 examined negotiation behavior and mood following self-disclosure paired with rude behavior. This time, participants in both conditions completed the self-disclosure task; however, the two conditions received different feedback. Participants in the rude condition received feedback criticizing their life goals and describing their speech as poor quality, whereas the control condition received neutral feedback. Following this, participants completed two negotiation tasks, one of which was the Ultimatum Game with their self-disclosure partner and two novel proposers.

The first negotiation task was a forced choice paradigm in which participants selected one of two options. The first option represented the most economically rational option. Specifically, participants could give themselves $6, their speech task opponent $6 and a player not encountered before $0. The alternative was to punish their speech task opponent and allocate the money accordingly, $5 to themselves, nothing for their speech task opponent and $5 to the player not encountered before. Next participants proposed offers to the three opponents in the Ultimatum Game after which participants were allocated the role of the responder. Participants received a series of half fair (e.g. $5, $4) and half unfair (e.g. $1, $2) offers from their self-disclosure partner and the two novel opponents. The combined offers of the self-disclosure partner and the other two counterparts were identical. At the conclusion of the experiment, these opponents were rated on negotiation-relevant traits. Mood was assessed at several time points.

Participants in the rude feedback condition reported more anger and were more than four times as likely to choose the less rational choice in the forced choice task than participants in the neutral feedback condition. They also engaged in more altruistic punishment by rejecting a greater number of offers in the Ultimatum Game. Participants in the rude feedback condition choose to specifically punish their speech task opponent during the Ultimatum Game despite the fact that their other opponents combined gave exactly the same offers. Thus, participants' retaliation was directly targeted toward the opponent who insulted them. By contrast, the control condition illustrated that when not insulted self-disclosure resulted in more positive negotiation outcomes as participants in the control condition accepted more offers. Participants in the control condition also proposed fairer offers to the participant they self-disclosed with than to the novel participants which is consistent with studies illustrating that self-disclosure tends to be associated with greater co-operation (Morris et al., 2002).

Concluding Remarks

Research suggests that expressing anger as a negotiation strategy has limited effectiveness. The primary purpose of this chapter was to present emotion regulation strategies as a means to manage the detrimental effects of anger on negotiation outcomes. Specifically, work by ourselves and others suggests that the application of reappraisal to negotiation settings might prove useful in reducing anger, aggressive behavior, and conflict in negotiations. The first two studies we conducted converged with prior work in that reappraisal was associated with decreased anger relative to rumination or distraction (Fabiansson & Denson, 2009; Mauss et al., 2007; Ray et al., 2008).

Although these current studies illustrated that reappraisal is effective in reducing experienced anger, at this stage there is no support for the ability of reappraisal to curb

retaliatory negotiation behavior. For example, we found that participants were likely to propose similar unfair offers to their counterpart regardless of the emotion regulation strategy they engaged in (Fabiansson & Denson, 2009). Despite this, the latter two studies examining self-disclosure found that participants were more likely to accept offers from the person they self-disclosed with despite experiencing greater anger and receiving an insult from that person. The first self-disclosure experiment also illustrated that self-disclosure may be an effective strategy in conditions where mild anger is experienced. The second self-disclosure experiment suggests that this strategy is not effective when confronted with insulting behavior. These experiments demonstrate that self-disclosure may be used in situations where there is mild conflict. The benefit of self-disclosure is that unlike reappraisal it is a simple and brief manipulation that may temporarily help reduce conflict. However, a limitation of self-disclosure is that this would need to re-established upon each new negotiation counterpart.

Applying emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal or indirectly via self-disclosure does have benefits; however, the full extent of these strategies in improving negotiation behavior remains to be further investigated. Reappraisal is an effortful emotion regulation strategy and may be difficult to use for individuals who do not naturally tend to reappraise. It might be possible to train negotiators in effective reappraisal over several sessions. Such training could make reappraisal less effortful and may be particularly beneficial for individuals who tend to use other emotion regulation strategies. By improving the ability to reappraise, this may not only change self-reported emotion but also influence negotiation behavior.

Another way in which reappraisal may influence negotiation behavior is by using involved negotiation tasks similar to that commonly encountered in real life. For instance, in the

Ultimatum Game it is clear what is considered an unfair and fair offer and participants can automatically choose whether to accept or reject offers based on fairness rather than allowing for emotion regulation strategies to influence their decision-making. Using more effortful negotiation tasks such as negotiation scenarios that require problem solving may be more ammenable to emotion regulation strategies. Using problems that are more abstract and less concrete may mean that participants are less likely to simply apply a fairness-based decision rule when negotiating.

The ability to effectively regulate emotions in negotiations has several important practical implications. Regulating anger is important for health. Anger is associated with decreased well-being and problems including hypertension (Diamond, 1982). Regulating anger can reduce conflict and prevent aggression and may reduce workplace violence. Effectively regulating anger can help improve relationships between negotiators and facilitate future negotiations and may reduce the likelihood of stalemates.

Figure 1. Self-reported anger as a function of condition and time point in the experiment.

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