

Political Orientation and Moral Conviction:

A Conservative Advantage or an Equal Opportunity Motivator of Political Engagement?

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The 2004 U.S. Presidential election cast a spotlight on the importance of “moral values” in politics. Exit polls indicated that a plurality of voters selected moral values as the most important factor in how they voted in the election. Even more provocatively, 80% of those who mentioned moral values as the most important factor voted for President George W. Bush (Media Matters, 2004). Although the exit poll was quickly discredited (e.g., Langer, 2004), the notion that moral concerns motivate political involvement—especially for political conservatives—captured both the popular and academic mind. The subsequent surge of interest in the ties between morality and politics shows no sign of abating. Even 10 years later, interest in how morality relates to politics remains very strong (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Kurzban, Dukes, & Weeden, 2010; Skitka & Bauman, 2008).

This chapter seeks to answer three questions: (1) Do conservatives vest their positions on political issues with stronger moral conviction than liberals? (2) Do conservatives see more rather than fewer of their political positions as related to morality than liberals? And (3) does moral conviction have different effects on liberals’ and conservatives’ degrees of political engagement (e.g., intentions to vote, or engagement in activism)? We answer the first question by conducting meta-analyses of the association between political orientation and moral conviction with 41 separate issues and 21 samples; the second question by conducting a meta-analysis of the association between political orientation and individuals’ average moral conviction across multiple issues with 8 samples; and finally, the third question by testing whether political orientation moderates the relationship between moral conviction and political

engagement with 6 samples. Before turning to the details of these analyses, we first provide some background on the concept of moral conviction, and competing hypotheses about the likely relationship between morality and politics.

### **Moral Conviction**

Attitudes are positive versus negative evaluations that predict or contain behavioral dispositions (Campbell, 1963; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; 2007). People sometimes have meta-cognitions about their attitudes, such as a belief that a given attitude is strong, that is, that it is more extreme, certain, important and/or central than other attitudes they hold. Moreover, strong attitudes—regardless of how strength is operationalized—are more predictive of behavior than weak attitudes (see Krosnick & Petty, 1995 for a review)

Attitudes rooted in moral conviction (or “moral mandates”) represent a unique class of strong attitudes. Moral conviction refers to a meta-cognition that a given attitude is a reflection of the perceiver’s fundamental beliefs about right and wrong. Moral mandates are likely to be examples of strong attitudes (e.g., more extreme, certain, important), but not all strong attitudes are moral mandates. Someone’s position on same-sex marriage, for example, might be based on preferences and self-interests, such as a belief that it would be good for his floral business (more marriages, more flowers sold!). Someone else, however, may oppose same-sex marriage because her church doctrine and faith community defines marriage as a union between one man and one woman. If her church were to change its doctrine, she would likely revise her opinion as well. In other words, her attitude about the issue is based on normative convention rather than a personal sense of right and wrong. A third person, however, might see the issue of same-sex marriage in moral terms. This person believes that allowing same-sex couples to marry (or restricting their ability to marry) is simply and self-evidently, even monstrously, wrong. All three of these people

might have a strong attitude about same-sex marriage, but only the last person feels morally mandated.

Moral mandates have a number of characteristics that distinguish them from attitudes rooted in preferences or conventional beliefs (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Preferences reflect matters of taste and are by definition subjective. It is okay if others have a different point of view. Conventions are normative and defined by the group or relevant authorities. Attitudes rooted in convention are not perceived as universally applicable. If an attitude is rooted in convention rather than morality, for example, a person should be fine if people in other faith communities accepted the practice, even if her own faith community rejects it. Consistent with this idea, the degree to which people's attitudes are perceived as rooted in religious versus moral conviction are surprisingly weakly correlated, and religious conviction has distinct and sometimes dissimilar associations with other variables (e.g., Morgan, Skitka, & Wisneski, 2010; see also Skitka, Bauman, & Lytle, 2009; Wisneski, Lytle & Skitka, 2000). Religious convictions appear to be based more on perceptions of convention and obedience to authority than they are rooted in moral conviction.

Moral mandates are distinguished from attitudes that reflect preferences or conventions in a number of key ways, including the degree to which they are perceived as cultural universals, as objectively true, authority independent, motivating, and self-justifying (see Skitka & Morgan, in press; Skitka, in press). Moreover, vesting an attitude with increased moral conviction predicts (a) greater preferred social and physical distance from attitudinally dissimilar others, (b) lower levels of good will and cooperativeness in attitudinally heterogeneous groups, (c) greater inability to generate procedural solutions to resolve disagreements about the target issue, (d) greater distrust of otherwise legitimate authorities, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, to get the

issue “right,” (e) rejection of non-preferred decisions and policy outcomes, regardless of whether they are associated with exemplary fair or legitimate procedures and authorities, and (f) greater acceptance of vigilantism and violence to achieve morally preferred ends—effects that do not reduce to non-moral aspects of attitudes such as attitude strength (for reviews see Skitka, in press; Skitka & Morgan, in press).

Of greatest interest to the current chapter, moral conviction predicts political engagement. When people’s attitudes about political candidates reflect strong moral conviction, for example, people’s voting intentions and probability of voting increase, even when controlling for variables such as attitude strength or strength of partisanship (Morgan, Skitka, & Wisneski, 2010; Skitka & Bauman, 2008). Moral conviction also plays a key role in people’s willingness to engage in forms of collective action, including employment actions (e.g., union activism, Morgan, 2011) and political activism (e.g., Skitka & Wisneski, 2011; Van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011; Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2011). To what extent, however, does the motivational push of moral conviction advantage those on the political right versus left?

### **The Conservative Advantage Hypothesis**

There are a number of reasons to predict that conservatives are more likely to root their political attitudes in moral conviction than liberals. Among other things, the Republican Party has very self-consciously (and to a considerable degree successfully) branded itself as the party of moral values (Frank, 2004; Lakoff, 2002; 2004). Other research is consistent with the idea morality plays a stronger role in conservatives’ than liberals’ thoughts, feelings, and behavior. Conservatives are more likely than liberals, for example to see issues in terms of moral absolutes and to believe that morality is not nor should be culturally determined. Liberals, in contrast, are more likely to endorse cultural relativism, that is, the idea that people’s conceptions of right and

wrong are culturally variable and that cultural variability in morality is acceptable (e.g., Hunter, 1991; Layman, 2001; Van Kenhove, Vermeir, & Verniers, 2001). Given moral conviction is closely tied to beliefs about universalism (Morgan, Skitka, & Lytle, 2014; Skitka & Morgan, in press), these findings suggest that liberals may be less morally convicted about their attitudes than conservatives.

The idea that conservative politics are more likely to be motivated by moral concerns is also consistent with some aspects of moral foundations theory (e.g., Haidt & Graham, 2007; Graham et al., 2009). Liberals and conservatives alike see justice and harm as foundational to morality, but conservatives also see respect for authorities, loyalty to the group, and purity concerns as part of the moral domain. One implication of the idea that conservatives base their sense of right on wrong on a broader array of moral concerns than do liberals is that they may feel moral conviction about a wider range of issues than their liberal counterparts.

### **The Equal Opportunity Motivator Hypothesis**

Although some evidence is consistent with the conservative advantage hypothesis, there are also reasons to believe that liberals' and conservatives' political views are more similar than different in their connections to morality. Moral politics theory, for example, posits that liberals' and conservatives' political attitudes are equally rooted in moral concerns (Lakoff, 2002). Where liberals and conservatives differ, however, is that they have very different conceptions of what constitutes ultimate moral good and bad. Lakoff claims that conservatives' sense of morality can be explained by the internalization of a "strict father" model of the family that leads to a focus on self-reliance, discipline, moral strength, and resistance of evil as ultimate goods. In contrast, liberals' sense of morality can be explained by the internalization of the "nurturant parent" model of the family, which defines a fulfilling life as an empathetic and nurturing one. Moral politics

theory has recently received empirical support. Even when controlling for a host of alternative explanations, people with the strongest feelings about proper childrearing—regardless of whether their conception of proper childrearing emphasized discipline or nurturance—were also the most consistently liberal or conservative in their political opinions (Barker & Tinnick, 2006). In short, evidence suggests that different ideals about the family lead conservatives and liberals to develop different moral priorities and orientations (also see Altemeyer, 1996; McClosky & Chong, 1985; Milburn & Conrad, 1996; Tomkins, 1965). Nonetheless, liberals' and conservatives' worldviews are similarly moral ones that provide dissimilar models of what kind of person or behavior is “good” and “bad.”

In summary, there are some reasons to believe that conservatives and liberals think about morality in different ways, and that liberals may be less likely than conservatives to be moral absolutists. However, there are also reasons to believe that liberals and conservatives are likely to have equally strong moral convictions across issues even if their convictions are shaped by different worldviews or moral priorities<sup>1</sup>. We devote the remainder of this chapter to testing these competing hypotheses.

### **The Meta-Analysis**

To test connections between moral conviction, political orientation, and activism, we analyzed data from 21 samples, collected by either ourselves, our collaborators, or researchers who responded to an email requesting relevant data (see Table 1). To be eligible for inclusion, we required data sets to include information about political orientation and moral conviction. We also sought data sets that included information about political engagement (e.g., voting and

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<sup>1</sup> One could also interpret moral foundations theory as predicting that liberals' and conservatives' moral convictions are likely to be equally strong, but shaped by different foundations. However, as described above, moral foundations theory also predicts that conservatives endorse more moral foundations and therefore presumably moralize more issues than liberals.

activism). Unless otherwise noted, participants reported their political orientation from *very liberal* to *very conservative* on a 7, 8, or 9-point scale. Participants also reported their degree of moral conviction about one or more issues. That is, they responded to 1 to 4 items measuring the extent to which their position on an issue was, for example, “deeply connected to [their] beliefs about fundamental right and wrong?”, “a reflection of [their] core moral beliefs and convictions?”, “a moral stance?” and/or “based on moral principle?” (see Skitka, in press, for a review of moral conviction measurement).

For eight of the samples (identified in Table 1 as “most, least, random” samples), participants each read a list of between 10 and 18 issues that represented a broad array of topics, including (for example) abortion, same-sex marriage, gun control, the Iraq War, the economy, social security, and unemployment. Participants identified one (the ANES sample) or two (the remaining “most, least, random” samples) of the issues that they perceived as most and least important. Participants were also randomly assigned one or two additional issues. Participants then reported their degree of moral conviction regarding their most important issue(s), their least important issue(s), and the randomly assigned issue(s). For all remaining samples, participants reported their degree of moral conviction for one or more issues selected by the researcher.

Taken together, the current research included nationally representative, community, and student samples collected between 2004 and 2013. Across samples, participants reported moral conviction about 40 different issues with a combined total of 39,085 cases.

### **Question 1: Do liberals and conservatives feel similar levels of moral conviction about issues?**

More often than not, liberals and conservatives feel similar levels of moral conviction about any given issue. Exceptions are similarly, if not more, likely to indicate support for a



liberal than a conservative advantage hypothesis. As one can see in Table 2, conservatives reported stronger moral conviction than liberals about seven issues (immigration, abortion, states' rights, gun control, physician-assisted suicide, the deficit, and the federal budget). Liberals reported stronger moral conviction than conservatives about six other issues (climate change, the environment, gender equality, income inequality, healthcare reform, and education). Interestingly, the average effect size for issues for which liberals reported stronger moral conviction than conservatives was larger ( $r = -.17$ ) than the average effect size for the converse ( $r = .10$ ). Liberals and conservatives did not differ in their levels of moral conviction associated with the remaining 28 issues (e.g., gasoline prices, social security, unemployment, foreign policy, domestic surveillance, and welfare).

Analysis of the issues that participants themselves selected as most important yielded similar null results,  $r = .01$ ,  $p = .77$ ; conservatives and liberals did not differ in the degree to which they saw their most important issues in a moral light. Similar null effects emerged for randomly assigned issues,  $r = .00$ ,  $p = .94$ . Liberals felt somewhat stronger morally conviction about their least important issues,  $r = -.03$ ,  $p = .05$ , than did conservatives, but the effect accounted for less than 1% of the total variance in moral conviction. Finally, political orientation did not correlate with overall levels of moral conviction collapsing across all issues,  $r = -.00$ ,  $p = .82$ .

**Question # 2: Do liberal and conservative individuals differ in the number of issues they moralize?**

Put simply, the answer to our second question is “no.” Another way to test the hypothesis that conservatives moralize politics more than liberals is to consider people in each group's general tendency to moralize more (versus fewer) issues. To test individual differences in

liberals' and conservatives' tendency to moralize their political attitudes, we used the Moralization of Politics (MOP) scale (Wisneski, Skitka, & Morgan, 2011). The MOP was included in the eight "most, least, random" samples (Cronbach alphas = .63 to .92), and provides an index of individuals' general tendency to moralize across a wide range of issues controlling for attitude importance by averaging people's strength of moral conviction for most important, least important, and randomly assigned issues. Results indicated stronger support for the equal opportunity than the conservative advantage hypothesis. Collapsing across all samples, political orientation was uncorrelated with participants' general tendency to moralize political issues,  $r = -.01, p = .73$ .

In summary, liberals and conservatives sometimes differ in the degree of moral conviction they attach to specific issues: conservatives, for example, are more morally convicted than liberals about the federal budget and deficit, immigration, and abortion, whereas liberals are more strongly convicted than conservatives about inequality, education, and the environment. Nonetheless, liberals and conservatives do not differ in their (a) overall levels of moral conviction collapsing across issues, (b) their levels of moral conviction for issues that are of most importance to them, or (c) tendency to moralize more rather than few issues (controlling for issue importance). People across the political spectrum are similar in their propensity to ground their positions in moral conviction.

### **Political Engagement**

Although people on the left and right have similar levels of moral investment across issues, one might wonder whether moral conviction has similar downstream effects for liberals and conservatives. That is, does moral conviction similarly shape liberals' and conservatives'

levels of political engagement? Our review indicates that the answer to this question is a resounding “Yes.”

Previous research indicates that moral conviction motivates both liberals and conservatives to show up at the polls on election days. In a nationally representative study shortly following the 2000 U.S. Presidential election, for example, moral conviction was an equally strong predictor of reported voting behavior regardless of party identification or candidate preference (Skitka & Bauman, 2008, Study 1). Likewise, moral conviction about hot-button political issues in the 2004 election cycle (i.e., abortion, same-sex marriage, and the Iraq War) equally predicted both John Kerry and George W. Bush supporters’ intentions to vote in the 2004 U.S. Presidential election (Skitka & Bauman, 2008, Study 2).

To further test whether moral conviction predicts political engagement for people across the political spectrum, we analyzed data from six of the samples included in the above meta-analysis. In addition to information about participants’ political orientation and issue-specific moral conviction, each of these samples included measures of participants’ political engagement. In particular, the samples included measures of (a) participants’ general willingness to engage in activism (i.e., to attend political meetings, donate money to political causes, or distribute information about political issues), (b) participants’ willingness to engage in activism about a specific issue such as physician assisted suicide, gender equality, or same-sex marriage, and/or (c) participants’ willingness to vote.

For each sample, we entered centered moral conviction, centered political orientation, and the interaction of moral conviction and political orientation into either a standard or binary moderated regression equation to predict political engagement. As seen in Table 3, political orientation predicted political engagement for three of the seven analyses; in each case liberalism

was associated with greater issue-specific activism. For six of the seven analyses, stronger moral conviction predicted increased political engagement; as strength of moral conviction increased, political engagement increased. For only one of the analyses was the effect of moral conviction qualified by political orientation; moral conviction about physician-assisted suicide was a weaker predictor of intentions to engage in activism for liberals than conservatives. For six of the seven analyses, the effect of moral conviction was not qualified by political orientation—moral conviction similarly motivated political engagement for people on the left and right. In short, the evidence is much more consistent with the equal opportunity than the conservative advantage hypothesis.

### **Summary, Implications, and Future Directions**

Taken together, evidence converges on the finding that moral conviction is an equal opportunity motivator of political engagement regardless of whether people's political compass points to the left or right. Liberals and conservatives are equally likely to see politics through a moral lens. Furthermore, the degree to which people attach moral significance to issues or candidates similarly motivates political engagement. Although this conclusion entails accepting the null hypothesis of “no difference,” our confidence in our claim is bolstered by the facts that (a) most issues show no evidence of ideological differences in moral conviction, (b) when differences emerge, there is equal or stronger evidence of a liberal moral advantage than evidence of a conservative advantage, (c) when collapsing across issues, no differences emerge, and (d) we also observe no evidence in liberals' and conservatives' tendency to moralize issues across a range of importance (see also Greenwald, 1975).

These results represent an important correction to the common assumption that conservatives “own the market” when it comes to morality and politics, and that it therefore

accords them an advantage in persuading the public to adopt conservative policy positions or to elect conservative candidates (e.g., Lakoff, 2002; 2004). One might also assume that because conservatives theoretically base their worldviews on more foundations than liberals, that conservatives will therefore find reasons to moralize more issues than liberals as well (e.g., Graham et al., 2009). Our results indicate that even if conservatives embrace more moral foundations than liberals, or reason differently than liberals about morality (e.g. Van Kenhove, et al., 2001), these differences do not translate into a conservative tendency to moralize more issues or the political domain more generally at higher levels than liberals. Liberals and conservatives are equally likely to moralize politics, and morality is equally likely to predict their political engagement.

Although liberals' and conservatives' political preferences and political engagement are equally likely to be tied to their concerns about morality, it remains to be seen whether the same psychological processes shape how liberals and conservatives come to see an issue as moral in the first place. Moral politics theory (Lakoff, 2002; 2004), for instance, suggests that conservatives may be especially motivated by concerns about self-discipline (and to therefore be more morally convicted about the Federal budget and deficit), whereas liberals are motivated by concerns about empathy and nurturance and thus their greater concerns about income and gender inequality (cf. Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007). Similarly, Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013), suggest that conservative morality is preventative and avoidant, whereas liberal morality is proactive and approach-oriented. Further research is needed to learn whether or how easily moral convictions can be manipulated or exploited in an effort to mobilize voters and activists, and to better understand the cognitive and motivational processes that lead people to moralize issues in the first place.

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Table 1

*Sample Source, Sample Characteristics, Method of Issue Selection, and Issues*

	Sample Characteristics	Citation	Year Collected	Issue Selection	Issues (correlation coefficient for political orientation and issue-specific moral conviction, and issue-specific <i>n</i> )
1	Nationally representative, American National Election Study	ANES (2012)	2012	most, least, random	abortion (.16, 374), federal budget (.24, 455), economy (.00, 490), education (-.02, 226), environment (-.07, 341), healthcare (.03, 273), immigration (.06, 234), same-sex marriage (.11, 682), unemployment (-.06, 360), war on terror (.09, 224), most (.09, 1229), least (.03, 1234), randomly assigned (.08, 1235), MOP (.08, 1235)
2	Nationally representative, Templeton Foundation	Vaisey (2013)	2012	most, least, random	abortion (.19, 831), education (-.15, 567), environment (-.23, 653), healthcare (-.06, 772), housing crisis (-.03, 571), immigration (.10, 770), income inequality (-.21, 817), same-sex marriage (.03, 1096), social security (-.01, 513), taxes (.05, 524), deficit (.20, 783), unemployment (.01, 970), most (.05, 1480), least (-.08, 1480), random (.02, 1481), MOP (.01, 1485)
3	Nationally representative, focused on Supreme Court decision about physician-assisted suicide	Skitka, Bauman, & Lytle (2009)	2005	researcher selected	states' rights (.11, 834), physician-assisted suicide (.16, 831)
4	Nationally representative, focused on Iraq War	Skitka & Wisneski (2011)	2003	researcher selected	Iraq (.10, 2466)
5	Online community sample of US residents, focused on the 2008 U.S. Presidential election	Morgan, Skitka, & Wisneski (2010)	2008	most, least, random, preferred candidate, economic bailout	abortion (.07, 451), energy (.08, 296), environment (-.26, 296), gas prices (-.02, 340), healthcare (-.16, 343), homeland security (-.03, 281), housing crisis (-.02, 281), immigration (.22, 328), Iran (.09, 259), Iraq (-.09, 323), same-sex marriage (.05, 537), tax cuts (-.05, 280), unemployment (-.02, 270), most (-.00, 717), least (-.01, 716), randomly assigned (-.03, 718), candidate (-.05, 395), economic

					bailout (.10, 434), MOP (-.02, 718)
6	MTurk community, focused on the 2012 U.S. presidential election	Brandt, Wisneski, & Skitka (in preparation)	2012	most, least, random	abortion (-.02, 472), economy (-.05, 516), education (-.18, 345), energy (-.19, 344), environment (-.33, 411), gun control (.18, 500), healthcare (-.24, 487), immigration (.05, 465), social security (-.08, 285), unemployment (-.01, 543), war on terror (.15, 372), most (-.10, 819), least (-.08, 819), randomly assigned (-.07, 819), MOP (-.10, 819)
7	MTurk community	Wisneski, Hanson & Skitka (in preparation)	2012	most, least, random	abortion (.16, 324), economy (.15, 398), education (-.09, 216), energy (-.13, 220), environment (-.27, 237), gun control (.17, 298), healthcare (-.17, 267), immigration (.12, 279), social security (-.08, 180), unemployment (.05, 277), war on terror (.22, 228), most (.06, 506), least (-.00, 505), randomly assigned (.05, 506), MOP (.05, 506)
8	MTurk community	Wisneski, Hanson & Skitka (in preparation)	2013	most, least, random	abortion (.02, 141), economy (-.02, 174), education (-.06, 145), energy (.01, 85), environment (-.38, 97), gun control (.13, 116), healthcare (-.14, 137), immigration (.04, 175), same-sex marriage (-.26, 181), social security (.20, 87), unemployment (-.11, 129), war on terror (.12, 158), most (-.08, 408), least (-.04, 408), randomly assigned (-.05, 408), MOP (-.07, 408)
9	MTurk community	Conway, Skitka, & Wisneski (2013)	2013	most, least, random	abortion (-.09, 42), economy (.27, 64), education (-.18, 18), energy (-.01, 36), environment (.36, 19), gun control (.00, 46), healthcare (-.17, 44), immigration (.20, 45), same-sex marriage (-.10, 66), social security (.06, 12), unemployment (.19, 39), war on terror (-.39, 34), most (.04, 126), least (-.03, 126), randomly assigned (.00, 126), MOP (.01, 126)
10	MTurk community	Morgan (2013)	2013	most, least, random	abortion (.39, 98), climate change (-.33, 110), domestic surveillance (.01, 85), drug policy (.16, 119), environment (-.25, 101), foreign policy (.00, 63), healthcare (-.10, 113), homeland security (.25, 75), immigration (.15, 98), income inequality (-.22, 117), online censorship (-.05, 149), same-sex marriage (-.18, 157), social security (.12, 75), unemployment (.03, 245), welfare (.04, 62), most (-.01, 556), least (-.03, 554), randomly assigned (-.02, 557), MOP (-.03,

					557)
11	MTurk community	Hanson, Skitka, & Wisneski, 2012)	2012	researcher selected	gender equality (-.22, 208)
12	MTurk community	Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna (in preparation)	2012	researcher selected	economic bailout (.32, 74), nuclear power (-.17, 72)
13	MTurk community	Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna (in preparation)	2013	researcher selected	abortion (-.11, 214), gun control (-.04, 208), immigration (-.13, 211), same-sex marriage (-.21, 207)
14	Mturk community	Washburn & Skitka, (in preparation)	2013	researcher selected	military intervention in Syria (.03, 188)
15	USAMP community	Skitka, Wisneski, Hanson, & Morgan (in preparation)	2012	researcher selected	same-sex marriage (.15, 1536)
16	Israeli-Jewish undergraduates	Reifen, Morgan, Halperin, & Skitka (in press)	2008-2009	researcher selected	Israeli-Palestinian conflict (.08, 115)
17	American undergraduates	Skitka (2004)	2004	researcher selected	abortion (.08, 232), capital punishment (.04, 230), same-sex marriage (-.02, 231), testing as an undergraduate graduation requirement (-.03, 231)

18	American undergraduates	Skitka (2005)	2005	researcher selected	Iraq (-.15, .679)
19	American undergraduates	Skitka (2010)	2010	researcher selected	abortion (.03, .315), animal rights (-.03, .315), smoking (.08, .316)
20	American undergraduates	Wisneski & Skitka (in preparation)	2010	researcher selected	affirmative action (.18, .49), immigration (-.18, .49), same-sex marriage (.10, .49)
21	American undergraduates	Wisneski & Skitka (in preparation)	2008	researcher selected	abortion (.14, .38), capital punishment (.22, .44), nuclear power (-.06, .82)

*Note.* Political orientation was measured in Sample 4 from Strong Republican to Strong Democrat and subsequently reverse-coded to be consistent with all other studies.

Table 2

*Correlation Coefficients for Specific Issues, and Collapsing across Different Issue Types*

	Issue	<i>r</i>	Lower CI	Upper CI	<i>p</i>	<i>n</i>
Liberal MC > Conservative MC	climate change	<b>-.33</b>	<b>-.48</b>	<b>-.15</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	<b>110</b>
	environment	<b>-.23</b>	<b>-.31</b>	<b>-.15</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	<b>2155</b>
	gender equality	<b>-.22</b>	<b>-.35</b>	<b>-.09</b>	<b>&lt;.01</b>	<b>208</b>
	income inequality	<b>-.21</b>	<b>-.27</b>	<b>-.15</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	<b>934</b>
	healthcare	<b>-.12</b>	<b>-.19</b>	<b>-.05</b>	<b>&lt;.01</b>	<b>2436</b>
	education	<b>-.12</b>	<b>-.17</b>	<b>-.07</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	<b>1517</b>
Liberal MC = Conservative MC	nuclear power	-.11	-.27	.05	.17	154
	energy	-.06	-.18	.07	.37	981
	online censorship	-.05	-.21	.11	.56	149
	candidate	-.05	-.15	.05	.35	395
	tax cuts	-.05	-.16	.07	.43	280
	Iraq	-.04	-.22	.14	.63	3468
	mandatory testing	-.03	-.16	.10	.65	231
	housing crisis	-.03	-.09	.04	.43	852
	animal rights	-.03	-.14	.09	.65	315
	same-sex marriage	-.02	-.11	.06	.58	4742
	gas prices	-.02	-.13	.09	.73	340
	social security	-.00	-.08	.08	.93	1152
	unemployment	-.00	-.04	.04	.94	2833
	foreign policy	.00	-.25	.25	.98	63
	domestic surveillance	.01	-.20	.23	.91	85
	intervention in Syria	.03	-.11	.18	.64	188
	welfare	.04	-.21	.29	.74	62
	taxes	.05	-.04	.13	.30	524
	economy	.05	-.05	.14	.33	1642
	Israel-Palestine conflict	.08	-.11	.26	.43	115
	smoking	.08	-.04	.18	.18	316
	capital punishment	.08	-.07	.21	.29	274
	Iran	.09	-.03	.21	.15	259
	homeland security	.10	-.18	.36	.50	356
	war on terror	.10	-.01	.21	.08	1016
	drug policy	.16	-.02	.33	.08	119
affirmative action	.18	-.11	.44	.23	49	
economic bailout	.19	-.03	.39	.09	508	
Liberal MC < Conservative MC	immigration	<b>.07</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>&lt;.05</b>	<b>2654</b>
	abortion	<b>.09</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.15</b>	<b>&lt;.05</b>	<b>3532</b>



states' rights	<b>.11</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>.17</b>	<b>&lt;.01</b>	<b>834</b>
gun control	<b>.11</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.20</b>	<b>&lt;.05</b>	<b>1168</b>
physician-assisted suicide	<b>.16</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.23</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	<b>831</b>
deficit	<b>.20</b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>.26</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	<b>783</b>
budget	<b>.24</b>	<b>.16</b>	<b>.33</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	<b>455</b>
most	.01	-.04	.06	.77	5841
random	.00	-.04	.04	.94	5850
least	<b>-.03</b>	<b>-.06</b>	<b>.00</b>	<b>=.05</b>	<b>5842</b>
MOP	-.01	-.01	.04	.73	5854
all issues	-0.00	-0.03	0.02	0.82	39085

Table 3

*The Effects of Moral Conviction (MC), Political Orientation (PO), and the Interaction of MC and PO on Political Engagement*

Sample # from Table 1	Moral Conviction about...	Outcome Variable	Predictor	<i>B</i>	<i>p</i>
1	most important issue	general activism	MC	<b>.09</b>	<b>.00</b>
			PO	-.01	.75
			MCXPO	.00	.73
		voting intentions	MC	.92	.18
			PO	-.27	.65
			MCXPO	.28	.47
3	physician-assisted suicide (PAS)	PAS activism	MC	<b>.24</b>	<b>.00</b>
			PO	<b>-.08</b>	<b>.00</b>
			MCXPO	<b>.06</b>	<b>.00</b>
5	most important issue	voting intentions	MC	<b>.10</b>	<b>.00</b>
			PO	.00	.90
			MCXPO	-.02	.36
6	most important issue	Reported voting (yes, no)*	MC	<b>.37</b>	<b>.01</b>
			PO	-.08	.37
			MCXPO	.06	.41
11	gender equality	gender equality activism	MC	<b>.47</b>	<b>.00</b>
			PO	<b>-.21</b>	<b>.04</b>
			MCXPO	.01	.82
15	same-sex marriage	same-sex marriage activism	MC	<b>.27</b>	<b>.00</b>
			PO	<b>-.07</b>	<b>.00</b>
			MCXPO	-.00	.89

\**Note.* Findings for Sample 6 are the result of a binary logistic regression. All other findings are the results of standard regressions.