

A differentiated threat account of moral and political values

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Introduction

Psychological and social scientists have long attempted to ground political orientation and related moral values in basic cognitive, affective and behavioural processes (see Carney, Jost, Gosling & Potter, 2008 and Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003, for reviews). Prominent recent accounts have structured explanations of morality and politics around individual differences in threat sensitivity and related constructs (e.g., Duckitt, 2001; Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014; Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Jost, et al., 2003). The broad claim of such accounts is that heightened sensitivity to threat is positively associated with political conservatism.

In this chapter we argue that there is utility in differentiating among sensitivities to different kinds of threats. With Neuberg, Kenrick and Schaller (2011) we agree that “[t]he psychology of threat is most aptly characterized as the evolved *psychologies* of threats (plural)” (p. 1043, italics in original). Moreover, we claim that sensitivities to different kinds of threats are associated with different political orientations and moral values; while sensitivities to some threats may very well be associated with conservatism, sensitivities to other threats may be associated with liberalism.

In this chapter, after considering the details of extant accounts of threat, politics and morality, we provide a theoretical justification for differentiating amongst kinds of threats (grounded in evolutionary and clinical psychology). We then show that while sensitivities to some kinds of threats (especially disgust-related threats) are associated with conservative moral values, sensitivities to other kinds of threats (especially social threats) are associated with a liberal worldview. We end by considering other loci of differentiation in the work on threat, morality and politics.

Threat, politics and morality

The most influential recent account of the relationship between threat sensitivity and political orientation is Jost et al.'s (2003). According to Jost and colleagues, political conservatism is the ideological expression of psychological attempts to manage fear and uncertainty. Existential and epistemic threats activate goals to reduce those threats, goals which are fulfilled by resisting change and endorsing inequality (two key planks of the conservative platform). One key tenet of this account is that people who are dispositionally-prone to experience fear should be inclined towards political conservatism as a coping strategy. In a meta-analytic survey of extant work, Jost and colleagues found positive associations between measures of dispositional threat sensitivity and political conservatism, although the size of the associations varied across measures, being largest for mortality salience, followed by measures related to belief in a dangerous world, followed by more general measures of Neuroticism.

More recent accounts within psychology and political science have built upon this theorizing. Janoff-Bulman (2009; see also Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013) singles out the Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) as especially relevant in understanding political conservatism. On Janoff-Bulman's account, the BIS, which is the neurobehavioral system that mediates reactivity to threat and punishment, underpins conservatives' motivations to maintain social order and protect the larger community.

Hibbing et al (2014) ground political orientation in an even broader cognitive-affective individual difference: the negativity bias. Hibbing and colleagues suggest that conservatives are more sensitive to *all classes* of negative stimuli (not only threatening stimuli) than are liberals (although they do briefly acknowledge possible exceptions to this overall pattern).

Other work, which focuses on more specific moral values, shows a broadly similar pattern of results. Much of this work is done within the framework of Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2004), which posits that the moral universe is composed of five (or six) moral foundations: Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, Sanctity/Degradation, (Liberty/Oppression). The *Care* foundation emphasises compassion, empathy and absence of the suffering. Actions are deemed morally good in this foundation to the extent that they uphold these concerns; morally bad, to the extent that they violate them. The *Fairness* foundation is structured around equality, proportionality, reciprocity and justice and serves to regulate cooperative activity and condemn cheating and defection. *Loyalty* involves a moral duty to favor, support and protect the ingroup, while *Authority* centers of the morality of dominance and submission and respect for hierarchy. *Sanctity* emphasizes the dignity, purity, and nobility of humankind.

The first two foundations, *Care* and *Fairness*, have been termed the *Individualizing* foundations, given their emphasis on the preservation and protection of individual rights; whereas the *Loyalty*, *Authority* and *Sanctity* foundations have been dubbed the *Binding* foundations, as it is argued that endorsement of these foundations serves primarily to protect the group. These higher order foundation clusters are of particular relevance here because research has shown that whereas political liberals tend to moralize the Individualising foundations, political conservatives tend to moralize all five foundations (e.g., Graham et al., 2009). Thus, patterns of moral foundation endorsement can be used as an index of political orientation.

Broadly speaking, work linking threat sensitivity to moral foundation endorsement has found that some measures of threat sensitivity are associated with a pattern of moral values indicative of a conservative worldview (specifically with increased endorsement of the *Binding* foundations). Van Leeuwen and Park (2009), for example, showed that *belief in a*

dangerous world (BDW) negatively predicted the moral foundations *progressivism* score (*Individualising* minus *Binding*). Further, Wright and Baril (2013) found that BDW positively predicted *Binding* foundation endorsement.

Although all this work suggests that threat sensitivity is associated with conservatism and Binding endorsement, there is reason to believe that the story may be a little more complicated. Common to the above accounts of political orientation and moral values is theorizing at a rather molar level, a level at which important theoretical distinctions are not made among threat-related constructs. Yet even within extant work there is reason to suspect that not all threat-related constructs show the same pattern of associations with moral and political values. As mentioned above, Jost et al (2003) report that while certain threat-related variables predict conservatism (e.g., belief in a dangerous world) others, such as Neuroticism do not. This latter finding is consistent with more recent meta-analyses that demonstrate null or even *negative* associations between Neuroticism and political conservatism (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, & Ha, 2010; Hirsh, De Young, Xu, & Peterson, 2010; Sibley, Osborne, & Duckitt, 2012). In addition, empirical work that has examined the role of the BIS in the political domain has yielded null findings (Amass, 2004; Sheikh, 2007) or has shown that liberals score higher than conservatives (Iyer's study as cited in Inbar & Pizarro, 2014a). And work on moral foundation endorsement (e.g., Hirsh et al., 2010) has found no evidence that Neuroticism in general, or its two aspects (withdrawal and volatility), show any clear associations with moral foundations. This variation in findings suggests that it may be worth explicitly considering distinctions among threat-related constructs when it comes to understanding moral values and political orientations. We argue, in what follows, that while some threat-related constructs may indeed relate to a conservative worldview, others may in fact relate to a liberal worldview.

A differentiated threat account of moral values and political orientation

A *threat* is anything (sentient or not) likely to cause damage or danger. On this definition, many different kinds of things may be threats – other people, animals, moving vehicles, microbes, guns. While some threats may be unique to recent historical times (e.g., plane crashes), others may have posed long-standing and recurrent evolutionary challenges and may thus played a role in shaping our evolved psychology (Neuberg et al., 2011). Evolutionary theorizing about threat-related psychology posits the existence of a suite of domain-specific threat-detection modules, each attuned to a different class of evolutionarily-relevant threats (e.g., Boyer & Bergstrom, 2010). Candidate threat classes include: predation, contagion/contamination, social harm (e.g., ostracism), status threat, resource scarcity, reproductive risk and conspecific violence among others (Boyer & Bergstrom, 2010; Boyer & Lienard, 2006).

Although different threat-detection systems may share some attributes, on the evolutionary account, each module is likely to be domain specific. Thus each module will be sensitive to cues relevant to a specific class of threat. Further, each module is likely to involve rather different computations and outputs because both the cues relevant to and the responses pertinent to different kinds of threat differ. As Boyer and Bergstorm (2010) argue, cues relevant to the detection of predators may not be the same as those that indicate infection. Moreover, the behaviours required to avoid mobile predators are likely to be different to those required to avoid a static source of contamination (e.g., purified meat).

Lending some credence to the notion of a taxonomy of differentiated threats, work in clinical psychology suggests that the stimuli central to certain psychopathologies of threat-processing, such as OCD and phobias, show a structure similar to that hinted at by evolutionary theorizing. Some theorists suggest that psychopathologies are instances of

functional psychological systems gone to extremes. Öhman, for example, has suggested that adaptive systems pertinent to the detection of evolutionarily-relevant threats may be comprised into producing certain phobias (e.g., Öhman, 1986, 2000). If this were true, one would expect the kinds of stimuli around which phobias are structured to be the very same for which we have dedicated threat-detection modules.

Consistent with this notion, the classes of threat stimuli that emerge when considering variants of anxiety-related disorders in clinical work mirror those posited as recurrent evolutionary hazards. In an influential review of factor analytic studies on fears, Arindell, Pickersgill, Merckelbach, Ardon and Cornet (1991) found that over 90% of all fear dimensions assessed could be summarized using four factors. One factor was loaded on by items relating to *fear of social evaluation*, including fear of criticism, and rejection. A second related to *agoraphobic fears*, which was indicated by items assessing discomfort with crowds, crossing streets, and being in public places. A third factor tapped *fear of animals*, including small animals (e.g., mice) and creepy-crawlies (e.g., insects). The fourth factor was a heterogeneous collection of items reflecting *blood-injection-injury fears*, such as fear of injection/blood, fear of disease, contamination and death. As Öhman (2000) argues, these four factors not only reflect four prominent types of phobias: social, agoraphobic, animal and blood-injection-injury (BII), but also represent recurrent evolutionary threats: fear of social interaction, abandonment, predation, contamination and injury.

Not only do threatening stimuli cluster into evolutionarily and clinically meaningful groupings, sensitivity to different clusters of stimuli may differentially predict outcomes of moral relevance. In one study, Perkins, Kemp and Corr (2007) showed that only fears related to tissue damage (part of the blood-injection-injury grouping) were a unique predictor of performance in a task requiring participants to consider an extraction plan for a military

operation, a plan involving the weighing of combatant lives. Other FSS-III factors did not uniquely predict performance in this task.

Taken together, this work suggests, at least from a measurement point of view, that there might be utility in distinguishing among kinds of threats when predicting various outcomes. But how might these different threat sensitivities relate to moral and political values? Given that both animal and BII phobias have been shown to have a common disgust-related affective base (see Cisler, Olatunji, & Lohr, 2009 for a review) and that disgust-sensitivity has been associated with political conservatism and related moral values (e.g., Inbar & Pizarro, 2014b), we suggest that sensitivities to these kinds of threats will be positively associated with endorsement of the Binding foundations and with political conservatism.

What associations will manifest between Social Evaluation and Agoraphobic threat sensitivities and moral values? On the one hand, it is possible that heightened sensitivity to social threats and fear of abandonment and neglect when in need will be associated with more conservative values. Belief in a dangerous world (which is a measure of fear of crime...) is associated with increased Binding endorsement and with a conservative worldview (van Leeuwen & Park, 2009; Wright & Baril, 2013). Further, on Öhman's (2000) account, social fears are part of the dominance-submissiveness system, which should be attuned to regulating the Authority/Subversion foundation, a central concern for political conservatives.

On the other hand, however, work in clinical psychology suggests that people with hyperactive social threat-detection systems (i.e., those suffering from social anxiety disorders) may be more focused on the interpersonal morality of the individualizing foundations. Evidence from retrospective studies shows that social phobic adults recall childhoods replete with bullying, humiliation and criticism (Hackmann, Clark & McManus,

2000; Hackmann, Surway, & Clark, 1998; Hope, Heimberg, & Klein, 1990). Rapee and Heimberg (1997) further showed that those with social phobia assume that others are inherently critical, yet place high value on the importance of being positively valued by others (see Rapee & Spence, 2004, for a review). This suggests a set of preferences and beliefs surrounding *interpersonal* interaction that prioritises positive regard as an end, but assumes that others will not naturally seek such an end. In a world full of critical and bullying others, one might value moral rules that promote care and fair treatment and inhibit harm and unfairness. Consistent with this, people who fear rejection by intimate others or the social group have been found to be particularly concerned with reciprocity and fairness (Bartz & Lydon, 2008; Erwin, Heimberg, Schneier, & Liebowitz, 2003; Koleva, Selterman, Iyer, Ditto, & Graham, 2014).

Social Threat, Disgust-related Threat and Moral Values

To test these possibilities, we (Laham & Corless, 2014) conducted a large online survey assessing people's sensitivities to various kinds of threatening stimuli and their moral values. Eight hundred and fifty-six US citizens participated via Amazon Mechanical Turk. They completed the Fear Survey Schedule-III (FSS-III; Wolpe & Lang, 1964) as a measure of differentiated threat. This is a 52-item measure that asks people to rate the extent to which each of 52 stimuli (e.g., snakes, failure, bats, journeys by car, human blood) cause fear and disturbance. The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011) was used to assess the extent to which people endorse the five moral foundations.

Exploratory factor analysis of the FSS-III yielded a three factor solution which provided initial measurement evidence for distinguishing between at least three kinds of threat. These were labelled *Social Evaluation Threat*, *Agoraphobic Threat*, and *Disgust-*

related Threat. This last factor was a combination of BII, contamination and animal threats. It was labelled *Disgust-related threat* as recent work suggests a role for disgust in specific phobias such as spider and BII, and in contamination-related OCD (Cisler et al., 2009). These factors were only moderately correlated with each other, suggesting that they are not redundant.

A similar factor analysis of the MFQ yielded a two-factor solution: Individualizing and Binding. These higher order foundation clusters often emerge when the MFQ is factor analysed (e.g., Hirsh et al., 2010).

Consistent with the differentiated threat account, while Disgust-related threat was positively associated with *Binding* values, Social Evaluation threat was positively associated with *Individualizing* values. A similar pattern emerged when each of the moral foundations clusters was regressed onto the set of three threat variables: Disgust-related threat was the only unique predictor of *Binding*, whereas Social Evaluation threat uniquely and positively predicted *Individualizing*.

To assess the generalizability of these effects, we conducted a similar study with a sample of Australian undergraduate students. Much work on the relationships between threat, morality and politics has been conducted in the US, so it is worth considering whether there is even minimal generalizability of the current findings across political contexts. Two hundred and twenty-one participants completed the FSS-III and the MFQ. Factor analyses of these scales yielded largely similar three and two factor solutions, respectively, suggesting that the structures of threat sensitivity and moral foundations are generalizable to the Australian context. Correlation and regression analyses also gave results similar to the US sample: Social Evaluation Threat was positively associated with *Individualizing*;

Contaminant threat, with *Binding*. These patterns held both for zero-order associations and in multiple regression contexts.

To get a more fine-grained sense of the role of these different threats, we decomposed the foundation clusters into individual moral foundations. When regression analyses were re-run using each individual foundation as a dependent variable, results largely replicated analyses using the foundation clusters. That is, Social evaluation threat uniquely predicted both Care and Fairness, whereas Disgust-related threat uniquely predicted Loyalty, Authority and Sanctity. This broad pattern of results held across both samples (except for the effect of social evaluation threat on Care, which was $p = .11$ in the Australian sample).

Having thus established the utility of a differentiated threat account in explaining variation in moral values, we next sought to explore the role of social and disgust-related threat sensitivities in the relationship between personality and political orientation.

Threat Sensitivities, Political Orientation and the Neuroticism-Conservatism Paradox

Social scientists have long attempted to ground political orientation in personality processes (see Carney, Jost, Gosling & Potter, 2008 and Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003, for reviews). Two of the most consistent findings are that Openness/Intellect positively predicted a liberal orientation, whereas Conscientiousness positively predicts a conservative orientation. (e.g., Gerber et al., 2010; Hirsh, De Young, Xu, & Peterson, 2010; Sibley, Osborne, & Duckitt, 2012).

Another remarkably consistent finding is the null or small *negative* association between Neuroticism and political conservatism (e.g., Gerber, et al., 2010; Hirsh et al., 2010; Sibley et al., 2012). In addition, neither Neuroticism in general nor its aspects (withdrawal or

volatility) show associations with moral foundation endorsement (Hirsh et al., 2010). This pattern of results may seem surprising given that Neuroticism is the personality domain most closely associated with threat sensitivity. A differentiated threat account of moral values may help explain this apparent anomaly.

To test this possibility, we adopted a modelling framework suggested by Lewis and Bates (2011), depicted in Figure 1, in which broad personality constructs (or their aspects) predict political conservatism via characteristic moral adaptations (moral values). We construe specific threat sensitivities as mediating between personality constructs and moral values. In the context of this model, we argue that the zero-order Neuroticism-moral value and Neuroticism-conservatism correlations are typically observed as null (or small negative) because they are *composed of indirect effects of opposite signs*, which add to yield a small overall effect.

We (Corless & Laham, 2014) conducted another MTurk study in which we measured the Big Five domains of personality, as well as their lower level aspects, using the Big Five Aspects Scale (BFAS, De Young, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007). We also administered the FSS-III, the MFQ and multiple measures of political orientation, including ideological self-placement on the political spectrum (general, social, economic) and an issue-based measure of political conservatism (Social and Political Conservatism Scale; SECS; Everett, 2013). In a sample of 347 US citizens, we replicated the FSS-III and MFQ factor structures mentioned above. We also showed, consistent with previous work, that Neuroticism (measured at the domain level) was positively associated with sensitivities to different threats, both at the zero-order level and when controlling for the other four domains of personality. Importantly, we replicated Laham and Corless (2014) in showing that while disgust-related threat was positively associated with *Binding*, social evaluation threat was positively associated with *Individualizing*. We also showed that *Binding* was positively, and *Individualizing* was

negatively, associated with political conservatism as indexed by ideological self-placement and SECS. Finally, replicating previous work, Neuroticism had a small, negative association with political conservatism ($r = -.14$ for with ideological self-placement composite and $r = -.21$ with the SECS).

Can the association between Neuroticism and political orientation be made sense of in light of the differentiated threat account? To answer this question, we considered whether specific threat sensitivities and moral values mediated the effects of Neuroticism aspects (Withdrawal and Volatility) on political orientation in a series of regression analyses (see Table 1). If one considers the pattern of regression coefficients in Table 1, one can see that while Withdrawal exerts a *positive* indirect effect on measures of political conservatism via disgust-related threat and Binding, it exerts a *negative and larger* indirect effect via social evaluation threat and individualising. Thus, the negative indirect effect of this aspect of Neuroticism on conservatism via social evaluation threat outweighs the smaller, positive effect via disgust-related threat, which biases the overall effect in a negative direction. When examining the individual paths that constitute the indirect effects, it can be seen that the primary source of the asymmetry in indirect effect size is that Withdrawal is more strongly related to social than disgust-related threat.

It is not surprising that it is the *Withdrawal* aspect of Neuroticism (as opposed to *Volatility*), that best accounts for this pattern of results. *Withdrawal* has been described as reflecting susceptibility to withdrawal related negative emotions (sample items: ‘Am filled with doubts about myself,’ ‘Worry about many things’), whereas *Volatility* reflects irritability and impulsiveness (sample items: ‘Get angry easily,’ ‘Change my mood a lot,’ De Young et al., 2007).

Additional loci of differentiation

Our focus thus far has been on distinguishing among kinds of threatening stimuli and exploring their differential associations with moral and political values. There is at least one other locus of differentiation that is worth discussing when it comes to the literature on threat, morality and political orientation: that between different measures of political orientation. First, however, let us consider another kind of distinction among predictors.

Further Differentiation among Predictors

We have focused on *horizontal* distinctions among kinds of threat stimuli at one level of generality. Another important distinction is between constructs in the *vertical* dimension – across levels of generality. Sensitivity to narrow classes of specific threats (e.g., social, disgust-based) can be thought of as being nested within broader threat-related constructs (e.g., Neuroticism). It is important to consider distinctions among constructs of different bandwidths (Cronbach & Gleser, 1957; John & Benet-Martinez, 2014) in work on threat, morality and politics. Using broad versus narrow measures of threat-sensitivity may lead to different results. Broadband constructs, such as Neuroticism or BIS seem to yield small to null effects (e.g., Hirsh et al., 2010), whereas narrower constructs, such as belief in a dangerous world, yield much larger effects (e.g., van Leeuwen & Park, 2009; although the size of these latter effects may be due to factors other than narrow bandwidth; see below).

One danger in operationalizing ‘threat-sensitivity’ at different levels of breadth or generality is that inferences about constructs at one level may be (mis)taken as inferences about constructs at another. For example, showing that BDW is positively (and strongly) associated with political conservatism and claiming, as a result, that *threat sensitivity* is

associated with political conservatism (as do van Leeuwen & Park, 2009, for example), is to move (perhaps unjustifiably) from an inference about a narrow construct (BDW) to an inference about a broad construct (threat sensitivity). Researchers should be careful when making claims about broad-bandwidth constructs, such as threat-sensitivity, based on narrowly-defined constructs, such as belief in a dangerous world.

Differentiating among political orientation variables

Much has been written about the appropriate way to measure political orientation; there are many measures and just as many critiques of each (see Everett 2013 for a review). Not only is there a need to demonstrate findings with multiple measures of conservatism (as we have done above), but there is also a need to distinguish among different dimensions of political orientation. Economic and social conservatism have been argued to be distinct dimensions of the conservative ideology and resultant of different underlying processes (Feldman 2013). Social (or sometimes *moral*) conservatism describes preferences for tradition and order and resistance to change. Economic conservatism describes attitudes towards resource redistribution. Duckitt (2001) has similarly suggested that RWA (which is associated with social conservatism) and SDO (which is associated with economic conservative) constitute two dimensions of the conservative ideology and are associated with different underlying psychological causes, namely perceptions of the world as dangerous place and perceptions of the world as a competitive jungle, respectively.

Indeed, some work on threat sensitivity and political orientation has found effects of threat on only one or the other of these two dimensions, suggesting that it is worth treating them separately. Wright and Baril (2013), for example, found that belief in a dangerous world is positively associated with social (as opposed to economic) conservatism. Verhulst et al.

(2012), on the other hand, showed that Neuroticism is positively associated with liberal economic attitudes.

In our data (Corless & Laham, 2014) a factor analysis of the SECS did not suggest a two-factor solution. However, computing separate indices for economic and social conservatism, based on Everett (2013), we found that the correlations between both social evaluation and disgust-related threats and political conservatism were stronger (and only significant) for the social dimension. The disgust-related threat finding is consistent with work showing that disgust-sensitivity is more strongly associated with social than economic conservatism (e.g., Inbar et al., 2012). The social evaluation threat finding suggests that sensitivity to social threats is associated with decreased acceptance of tradition and authority and with acceptance of change, rather than with a rejection of economic inequality. The prioritising of individual rights and fairness concerns over respect for tradition and the group may account for this association between social evaluation threat sensitivity and social liberalism.

Caveats and Future Directions

Given that the work covered in this chapter is the first on the differentiated threat account of moral values, numerous questions and ambiguities remain. One important issue is that of causality. Although we have adopted an implicit causal ordering of variables in our work (Neuroticism → Threat Sensitivities → Moral values → Political Orientation), we remain agnostic about the casual hierarchy underpinning the effects noted above. Whereas Jost and colleagues' (2003) motivated cognition account suggests that conservatism is a coping reaction to threat and thus caused by threat, other accounts suggest that both threat sensitivity and conservatism may share a common cause (e.g., Verhulst et al., 2012). Future

work should adopt both experimental and longitudinal/developmental approaches to clarify issues of cause.

Although some work has shown “conservative shift” after threat (e.g., Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009), this work has not distinguished between different kinds of threat. On the differentiated threat account, one might predict a conservative shift after a disgust-related threat and a liberal shift after a social evaluation threat.

While experimental research is important to establish the *possibility* that threat may causally affect moral and political values, any such demonstration does not guarantee the causal role of threat sensitivity in the ontogenetic development of moral values or political orientation. Thus, experimental work should be complemented with longitudinal work which can assess the casual ordering of variables during development (e.g., Block & Block, 2006).

Another shortcoming of the current work is the exclusive reliance on self-report measures of threat sensitivity. Although some extant work which has gone beyond self-report has shown that attentional biases towards negative stimuli are associated with political conservatism (e.g., Cararro et al., 2011; Dodd et al., 2012), this work has not explicitly distinguished among kinds of threat. Future work could use paradigms such as the dot-probe task, the emotional Stroop, the flanker task, and eye-tracking to assess cognitive processes associated with the processing of different kinds of threats, with a specific focus on distinguishing between sensitivities to social vs. disgust-related threats.

Conclusion

The work reviewed in this chapter provides initial support for the utility of differentiating among kinds of threats in developing threat-sensitivity accounts of moral

values and political orientation. Distinguishing between disgust-grounded specific phobic threats and social evaluation threats revealed that sensitivities to these different kinds of threats had opposing relationships with moral values and political orientation. While disgust-related threat sensitivity behaves much like extant theories would predict (being positively associated with conservatism and Binding endorsement), social evaluation threat sensitivity behaves in a way opposite to that predicted by extant accounts of threat, morality and politics. Distinguishing between these two kinds of threats also provides some insight into the somewhat puzzling association between Neuroticism and political conservatism. More broadly, this approach reiterates the importance of looking to evolutionary and clinical research in developing both theory and measurement for the psychology of morality.

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Table 1.

Regression weights and R^2 from Corless and Laham (2014).

Predictors	Criterion Variables						
	Social Evaluation Threat	Disgust-related Threat	Agoraphobic Threat	Ind.	Bind.	Ideological Self-placement	SECS
Withdrawal	.44**	.20**	.32**	.03	-.19**	-.05	.02
Volatility	.05	.04	.07	-.14 ⁺	-.04	-.04	-.13*
	$R^2 = .22^{**}$	$R^2 = .05^{**}$	$R^2 = .14^{**}$				
Social Evaluation Threat				.22**	-.13*	.03	.05
Disgust-related threat				.01	.15**	-.22**	-.15**
Agoraphobic Threat				-.08	.02	.14*	.02
				$R^2 = .04^*$	$R^2 = .20^{**}$		
Ind.						-.32**	-.12**
Bind.						.47**	.63**
						$R^2 = .30^{**}$	$R^2 = .38^{**}$

Note: Adapted from Corless and Laham (2014). Ind. = Individualizing; Bind. = Binding. ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; ⁺ $p < .10$.




Figure 1. Schematic of the associations between Neuroticism, threat sensitivities, moral values and political orientation