

3

SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DETERIORATION OF DEMOCRACY AND THE RISE OF AUTHORITARIANISM

The Role of Needs, Values, and Context

Daniel Bar-Tal and Tamir Magal

Introduction

The last few decades have witnessed a rise of authoritarianism in different countries that has signaled a dramatic change in the present era. Specifically, the trend can be observed in Turkey, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, India, Poland, Israel, and, more recently, in the Philippines and Brazil (Bochsler & Juon, 2020; Lima, 2020; Reykowski, 2020; Wodak, 2019). The election of Donald Trump with his authoritarian tendencies in the US clearly signaled a new world zeitgeist. These authoritarian regimes came to power in mostly **free and fair elections** (Burston, 2017; Knuckey & Hassan, 2020). Other European countries (such as France Germany, Italy, Spain, Holland, and Denmark) also have popular political parties which advocate at least some of the principles of authoritarianism.

The leaders of these new authoritarian parties openly express views which correspond with some or all of the following themes characteristically identified with authoritarianism, and challenge the principles of liberal democracy. *Anti-democratic structural theme*: interfering with the rule of law and democratic norms; disrespecting rules and regulations; impairing and weakening the legal system and law enforcement agencies; disempowering institutions that serve as guardians of democracy; harming the checks-and-balance system. *Anti-democratic values theme*: limiting freedom of expression and organization; violating human rights; favoring use of force. *Anti-pluralistic theme*: inciting and delegitimizing opposition; monopolizing patriotism; obliterating criticism, trying to control free media. *Discriminatory theme*: instigating racism, prejudice, and discrimination of minorities; encouraging ethnocentrism, sexism, and chauvinism; opposing immigration. *Threatening themes*: spreading a discourse of fear; using xenophobic messages; focusing on external threats and enemies. *Anti-structural societal themes*: blaming

the so-called old elites for deterioration of society and adherence to power; blaming past governments for corruption; blaming economic tycoons for exploiting the wealth of the nation. *Self-interest themes*: appointing functionaries predominantly on the basis of loyalty to the leader; encouraging adoration of strong leader with omnipotent rights; cultivating personal adoration. These themes have been expressed by authoritarian leaders with the intention of implementing them as directives and policies and enacting laws. Moreover, those who were elected to highest office used them as guidance in their practice (Bonikowski, 2017; Katsambekis, 2017; Rummens, 2017; Rupnik, 2007; see also Feldman: Forgas & Lantos; Kruglanski; and Marcus, this volume).

Many reasons can be identified for these developments now reshaping the political, societal, economic, and cultural nature of societies and the world in general. In the attempt to understand this trend, we need explanations from a variety of complementary approaches (Kriesi et al., 2006; Mudde, 2000; Reykowski, 2020; Učeň, 2007). In the present chapter, we take a particular socio-psychological perspective, trying to illuminate the psychological forces that play a significant role in the unfolding of authoritarian forces in originally democratic countries, where the elections are fair and free. We focus especially on cases in the Western world, as well as Central and Eastern European countries which built democratic regimes following the fall of the communist bloc in the late 1980s. After this fall, all of them held democratic and more or less free and fair elections, but with time authoritarian parties emerged and, in some cases, even won the elections (see Forgas & Lantos, on Hungary's slide to authoritarianism). However, the present conceptual framework can also be used in the analysis of societies in other parts of the world that hold free and fair democratic elections. In the present chapter, we distinguish between authoritarianism and populism. Authoritarianism implies limited reliance on democratic values, disregard of democratic formal mechanisms and principles, and personalized forms of leadership (see for example, Linz, 2000), while populism denotes offering ideas and activities, regardless of their feasibility, costs, and utility, with the goal of garnering the support of ordinary people (see for example Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). We are well aware that each of these two key concepts has a variety of definitions and conceptual frameworks.

Theoretical Basis

The basic foundation of the conceptual explanation lies within the seminal theory of Kurt Lewin (1951), who proposed that human behavior is a function of a perceived environment in which a person(s) operates with its physical and social factors and his/her tendencies, including ideas, thoughts, intentions, and fantasies. This theory means that, according to Lewin, what really matters in social life is not what happens in reality, but what is perceived and interpreted by human beings. Of special importance is Lewin's application of the theory to the group situation. He suggested that the behavior of a group, as that of an

individual, is affected greatly by the collective perception of the situation and the group's characteristics (Lewin, 1947; see also Golec de Zavala: Kruglanski; and Hogg and Gøetsche-Astrup, this volume). Of relevance to our conception is also his proposal suggesting that the human system enters into a tension state when a psychological need or intention appears. Tension is released when the need or intention is fulfilled. On the basis of this classical theoretical framework, we suggest that understanding collective political behaviors requires an analysis of the **psychological conditions in which the collective lives** and the **collective psychological state** of societies. This includes the key *psychological repertoire* of the collective, as well as their *immediate psychological response tendencies*.

Context

We propose to differentiate between two types of context: **lasting context** and **transitional context** (Bar-Tal, 2013). The former consists of relatively stable features that include socio-political-economic systems and structures, institutions, systems of beliefs and values, symbols, rules of behaviors, and cultural products. By contrast, **transitional context** by definition is limited to sudden major events, processes, and/or specific major information, which exerts influence on the views of society's members. They are experienced directly or indirectly, have relevance to the well-being of society's members and of society as a whole, occupy a central position in public discussion and the public agenda, and contain information that forces society's members to reconsider, and often change, their long-held socio-psychological repertoire (Bar-Tal, 2013). Major information provided by authoritative sources (for example, leaders or journalists) often complements major events and processes, because they are not clearly observed and understood, and often require explanation and clarification through their framing (see the concepts in Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2007; and also in Gitlin, 1980; Kinder, 2003; Mutz, 1998).

A Collective Psychological State

Individuals carry a psychological repertoire. Different psychologists emphasized many distinct elements of the psychological repertoire (see also Ditto; Krekó; and Marcus, this volume). We would like to focus on only two elements, which in our view play a major role in guiding individual and collective behavior: **needs** and **values**. **Needs** refer to the fundamental necessities that direct individuals, while **values** signify an abstract compass which directs their behaviors. Needs and values produce a strong drive to satisfy them, and when they are not satisfied, individuals feel strong deprivation, frustration, and dissonance. Their functioning is intimately involved in understanding the psychological roots of populism in rhetoric, as we will show.

Human needs are internal psychological forces that direct to action for their satisfaction. Deci and Ryan (2000) defined needs as “nutriments that are essential for ongoing psychological growth, integrity, and well-being” (p. 229). Needs are very important for human functioning, both as individuals and as a part of a collective. Social scientists proposed different lists of needs that are based on different conceptions (Etzioni, 1968; Goldstein, 1985). We have drawn our own list on the basis of known grand theories to include: Needs for understanding, for predictability, for mastery, for meaningfulness, for positive esteem, for safety, for justice, for belonging, and for identity (hence forth “basic human needs”). Satisfaction of all these needs is a prerequisite for human beings to function well in their societal system.

The notion of **values** appeared already in the writing of Durkheim (1897) and then later of Vernon and Allport (1931). We use in our conceptual framework the well-developed and widely accepted theory of Schwartz, who defined values as trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or groups (Schwartz, 1992). Values point to the desirable goals that motivate action, as well as guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people, and events. People decide what is good or bad, justified or illegitimate, worth doing or avoiding, based on possible consequences for their cherished values (Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 2006). According to Schwartz, values have the following functions: (1) They focus on attaining personal or social outcomes, (2) express openness to change or conservation of the status quo or (3) serve self-interests or transcendence of self-interests in the service of others, and (4) promote growth and self-expansion, or protect against anxiety and threat to self.

Schwartz first identified 10 basic values, later increased to include 19 values. We focus on the major ten values: Self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benevolence, and universalism (Schwartz, 1992, 2017; Schwartz et al., 2012). Utilizing Schwartz’s distinctions, we would like to congregate the ten to two general types of values: Particular and universal (Evanoff, 2004; Nussbaum, [1994, 2010]; Sznajder, 2007; Turner, 2002). Particular values have an in-group/collective direction with the emphasis on maintaining security, tradition, order, authority, well-being, collective identity, benefits, resources, and power of the in-group by strengthening loyalty to the collective, its continuity, and its stability. These values are based on the primary evolutionary needs that directed human beings to care about their kinship for survival through the ages. Universal values, in contrast, focus on the care and concern for human beings in general, based on the universal principles of equality, freedom, fairness, justice, and human rights (see also the work of Haidt, 2012; Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009 on moral foundations). This distinction is very relevant to our conception and enables us to better comprehend the sense of “violation of values” experienced by part of the population.

When the context prevents satisfaction of needs, unfulfilled needs give rise to feelings of deprivation and dissonance, which produce negative attitudes and emotions, such as frustration and distress (see also Ditto; Gelfand; Kruglanski; Marcus; and Vallacher, this volume), triggering a search for new ways to satisfy them. Need satisfaction can be achieved through real or symbolic means (narratives), or a combination of both. It is at this point that the search can lead members of a society to extremism—relying on authoritarian voices to satisfy their frustrated needs and values. This portrayal also corresponds to Maslow's theory locating needs in a hierarchical order. Maslow also acknowledged the role of the environment in the process of need satisfaction and recognized the relationship between needs and values (Maslow, 1971). Similar processes take place when contextual conditions violate dominant values of a society (Festinger, 1957), producing dissonance and distress, as well as a motivation to change the situation.

Requirements of the Democratic System

After introducing the conceptual framework, it is possible now to return to the subject of the chapter: the deterioration of democracy and the ascendance of authoritarianism. The basic assumption is that a democratic system, in contrast to other political systems (Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011; Wejnert, 2014; Wigell, 2008), has a number of critical psychological requirements that are necessary conditions for the proper functioning of the system. Democratic systems require knowledge of the democratic principles and values, internalization of the democratic values, motivation to maintain them, and involvement in their protection (Dahl, 1989; Oppenheim, 1971; Shin, 2017; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Democratic systems require voluntary acceptance, understanding, and cooperation, and cannot be taken for granted or imposed by force: It requires constant and continuous watchfulness by its citizens, organizations, institutions, and media, which will point out violation of its principles and values, caused by steps taken by its functionaries that harm democratic functioning. Many leaders, by their human nature, are often inclined to violate democratic principles and values that often stand in their way and limit their wants. Democracy involves progress on a narrow path where state power and the competence of society finely balance each other (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2020).

However, these requirements are rather demanding and can be considered as idealistic. The alternative assumption claims that in reality, most of society members do not possess comprehensive knowledge about the democratic system, do not internalize the values, do not respect its principles, and in general do not have an investment in its maintenance. Only a small layer of society is deeply personally involved and cares greatly about the functioning of the democratic system. Some of them are also concerned with its maintenance and protection. But, in most cases, large segments of a society support the democratic system only as long as it

satisfies their basic needs, corresponds to their values, is trusted, and is managed efficiently and reliably in their view (Chu, Bratton, Lagos, Shastri, & Tessler, 2008; Kluegel & Mason, 2004; Kotzian, 2010). When these conditions are broken, voluntary support for the democratic system is reduced or even vanishes, and members of a society search for other leaders and systems that can meet their needs, correspond to their values, and be trustworthy (Bochsler & Juon, 2020; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rupnik, 2007).

Democracies in the Western World Between War World II and 2000

We would like to postulate that since the end of World War II (WW-II), the context of the democratic systems satisfied the basic needs of society members most of the time, in most of the countries of the Western world where there were free and fair elections. There was a balance most of the time between the needs and values of society members and the democratic system (see Evans & Whitefield, 1995; Lühiste, 2013; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). The satisfaction of these needs was achieved through policies and actions and through persuasive messages that were accepted as truthful and provided meaning to society (see Shiller, 2019).

During this time, the United States, Western Europe, and other countries experienced unusually high and sustained growth, together with full employment. The recessions of the 1970s and the subsequent recession of the early 1980s were relatively short-lived, and the Western world continued its prosperity and expansion until the 2000s (Barro, 1999; Boix & Stokes, 2011; Dahl, 1971; Reykowski, 2020). Of special note are Central and Eastern European countries, which became separated from Western Europe following WW-II, with the creation of the “iron curtain” and communist totalitarian regimes (see also Forgas & Lantos, this volume). These countries longed for democracy and, when the communist regimes collapsed, almost all of them moved to establish democracy in the early 1990s. However, in the last 20 years many of these countries have also begun moving towards authoritarian rule, led by populist political parties and leaders (for example, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) (Bochsler & Juon, 2020; Karp & Milazzo, 2015; Rupnik, 2007; Učeň, 2007).

Contextual Changes Since 2000 and Consequences

The next step in our analysis suggests that a series of dramatically negative major events, processes, and information significantly changed the context of Western democratic societies, disrupted the satisfaction of basic human needs (such as loss of security, predictability, stability, certainty, belonging (affiliation), social identity, collective positive esteem, justice, and mastery), and violated widely held particular values. These major events, processes and major information changed the collective psychological state of society members.

Western liberal democracies experienced threats of terrorism, economic crisis, globalization, fundamental challenges to the traditional news media, intra-societal conflict and polarization, and threats of waves of immigrants and ethnic minorities, and most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic that caused to very powerful effect in every domain of human life, including immense detrimental economic crisis. In other words, these events, processes and provided information greatly undermined the needs and values of certain segments of society members, and thus subsequently disrupted their confidence in the shared narratives which allowed the maintenance of the democratic system. Our central point suggests that, in line with the Lewinian theorizing, what is of determinative importance in the reaction of society's members is the way they view and understand the events, processes and the information. Experiences are comprehended on the basis of their interpretation. The key experiences were perceptions of realistic and symbolic threats (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan, Renfro, & Davis, 2008; see also Ditto; Gelfand; Kruglanski; Marcus; Vallacher & Fennell,; this volume). Realistic threats refer to the perception of possible loss of human lives, territory, resources, economy, power, status, or general welfare. Symbolic threat deals with threats to cultural purity, to national uniqueness, to religious homogeneity and especially to exclusiveness of the collective identity (see also Golec de Zavala, this volume). The experiences of threats have been the key experiences which ignited a chain reaction that led to a loss of meaning, predictability, and meaningfulness; loss of sense of security and justice; loss of belongingness, esteem, and social identity; as well as loss of sense of control and mastery. On the general level, these threats changed the collective psychological state of large parts of society members.

In sum, the experience of negative consequences led to disappointment and loss of trust in the political system of democracy, and instigated a search for alternatives that will satisfy the experienced deprivations and dissonance. Trust in the system is a pre-requirement for its successful and efficient functioning, legitimization and acceptance by society's members (Grimes, 2006; Kaase, 1999; Marien & Hooghe, 2011; Reykowski, 2020).

In this part of the chapter we describe some of the major events, processes and major information that shook the world since 2000, led to major changes in the collective psychological state in different countries, and brought about the ascendance of authoritarian leaders and parties. However, we should note that: (1) The contextual effects of the same major events, processes, and information have differed in various societies in their intensity, and frequency, (2) societies differed in the way their governments coped with the challenges, and (3) societies also differ in their lasting cultural context and in their collective psychological state, and therefore reacted differently. Obviously, these developments were not universal. Not all society members experienced the crises similarly, and not all of them felt disappointment with the democratic system and searched for a different way of being governed. In some countries, authoritarian leaders won elections (for example, in Hungary, Poland, USA); in other countries, authoritarian parties

gained votes (or example, in France, Italy, Germany, etc.), and in some other countries the effects were minor (e.g. Australia, New Zealand). The delineation of all the influencing characteristics is beyond the scope of this chapter.

We will describe now only several major events, processes, and informational frameworks as examples that shook the world and point out their effects.

Terrorism

The first category of major events is terrorism. Although not a new phenomenon, its appearance in the 2000s shook the world because of its intensity, frequency, global spread, and radical ideological Islamist origins.¹ The most significant terrorist attack, incomparable to any other in modern history, occurred on September 11, 2001. This event included four civilian aircraft, hijacked by Muslim militants, striking two singular symbols of American power on US soil: The World Trade Center in NY and the Pentagon. This attack resulted in 2,977 fatalities, over 25,000 injuries, and at least \$10 billion in property damages (CNN, 2019).

The attack on United States was followed by several major terrorist events carried out in different parts of Europe by Islamic militants, including Madrid and London (2004/2005) and then Paris (2015); Brussels, Nice, and Berlin (2016); Manchester, London, and Barcelona (2017); Strasburg (2018); and London (2019). These events left hundreds of people killed or injured.

Because they occurred in major cities in USA and Europe, they had great effect on Americans and Europeans, far beyond the cities and countries where they happened. They shattered the illusion of living in security for millions of Americans, Europeans, and beyond. They signaled that there is no secure place in the world, and that terrorists can penetrate into the most guarded places. The attacks had immediate effects: They severely threatened basic human needs and violated cherished values, while instilling a deep sense of injustice and victimhood (Arvanitidis, Economou, & Kollias, 2016; Godefroidt & Langer, 2018; Marshall et al., 2007).

Studies have shown that terrorism produces higher levels of prejudice and discrimination against minority groups, as well as lower levels of tolerance for minorities and immigrants, especially for Muslims (Castanho, 2018; Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006; Vellenga, 2008). Higher levels of uncertainty and anxiety led to greater acceptance of severe restrictions on civil liberties that contradict democratic principles (Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Kossowska et al., 2011).

The Economic Crisis in 2008

The **financial crisis of 2007–08**, also known as the **global financial crisis**, was a severe worldwide economic crisis, considered by many economists and

opinion leaders to have been the most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The crisis began in 2007 with a depreciation in the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States, and developed into a full-blown international banking crisis with the collapse of the major banks, such as Lehman Brothers. The crisis had a tremendous downturn effect on the global and states' economies, and severely affected the economic standing of many individuals (Eichengreen & O'Rourke, 2010; Eigner & Umlauf, 2015; Reykowski, 2020)

The crisis instigated many revelations about its causes and processes, as well as more general understandings about economic processes. The public learned that (1) the gap between poor and rich grew considerably through the years, (2) rich people accumulated incredible wealth—many through speculation and unproductive ways, (3) the middle class did not prosper nor improve its economic standing through the decades, (4) the federal system in the US had to bail out irresponsible bankers at huge cost, and (5) the individuals responsible were not punished (Patterson & Koller, 2011; Snow, 2011; Wolff, 2010). All this led to loss of trust in governmental institutions, as well as deprivation of basic epistemic human needs (Earle, 2009; Hernandez & Kriesi, 2016; Kroknes, Jakobsen, & Grønning, 2015).

Waves of Immigration

The second decade of the 21st century was characterized by a significant influx of immigrants to Europe, as well as to the US. The wars in Iraq and Syria, as well as severe economic conditions and violence in several African countries (Sudan, Eritrea, Libya), culminated in the migration of hundreds of thousands of people towards Europe (BBC, 2016 Metcalfe-Hough, 2015; Sobczykński, 2019). At the same time, a similar “wave” was taking place in Latin America, where people from violent- and poverty-ridden countries—like Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico—migrated to the US, searching for better life (Kim, Carvalho, Davis, & Mullins, 2011; Preston & Archibold, 2014).

The influx of immigrants caused a sense of threat among citizens of many countries in Europe and the US (Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008; Fetzer, 2000; McLaren, 2003). It led to fear of losing uniqueness, particularity, distinctiveness, and exceptionality, which characterize a national or an ethnic group and stand at the core of its particularistic values. (Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, & Lahav, 2015; Bruneau, Kteily, & Laustsen, 2018; Rydgren, 2008).

Additionally, immigrants threatened economic security, because money was spent on their integration and welfare instead of on the societal needs of the citizenry. Furthermore, society's members perceived a potential employment threat, despite the fact that most of the jobs taken by immigrants were shunned by locals (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015; Fetzer, 2000; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Oesch, 2008). Indeed, a November 2018 poll found that the majority of citizens in European

countries (66% average) blamed migration for spike in local crime (Abraham, 2019). Furthermore, in an April 2016 survey, the majority of respondents in five European countries believed Muslim immigrants threatened their job security and economic benefits (overall average 50%) (Wike, Stokes, & Simmons, 2016).

Social Media and Veracity of Information

Credible factual political information is an essential ingredient for political participation in a democracy (see also Cooper & Avery; and Krekó, this volume). It is assumed that citizens make decisions and take action, on the basis of reasoned arguments and careful consideration of different ideas and viewpoints, in the “marketplace of ideas”. Throughout the 20th century, traditional forms of mass media—newspapers, radio, and television—with their normative obligation to professional standards of veracity and credibility, served as the main arena for public deliberation. Additionally, friendship networks, social gatherings, and cultural events also served as venues for the exchange of sometimes uncorroborated, biased, and often misleading “word-of-mouth” information, which also influenced political behavior. However, these two modes of transmission were very distinct and separated from each other.

The Internet and “social media” revolution of the 21st century blurred the distinction between these two modes of information and cast significant doubts on the credibility and veracity of traditional media-based political information. Social media is an online platform which allows ordinary people to build social networks with other people, to communicate and maintain relationships with them, and to share own thoughts, experiences, and ideas. This platform opened a completely new mode of interrelating, sharing, as well as disseminating, exchanging, and receiving information across the world. Facebook and Twitter are among the most commonly used (Shearer & Grieco, 2019).

However, the consumption of news and political information through social media raises several threats to the democratic process: Live news feeds are customized for each user by mathematical algorithms, based on the probability the news item would be liked by him. Such selection inhibits exposure to opposing views and thus reinforces existing opinions (Dylko et al., 2017). This phenomenon, termed “echo chamber” or “filtering bubble”, has been demonstrated in several recent studies regarding the political effects of social media (Boutyline & Willer, 2017; Carpenter, 2010; Spohr, 2017). In a 2019 Pew study, 79% of respondents agreed that social media services prefer news sources with a specific political stance, while 53% agreed that one-sided and inaccurate news represented a serious problem on social media feeds (Shearer & Grieco, 2019). The echo chamber effect is further compounded by the use of “likes” and re-posts, where users recycle and distribute news items among their contacts and friends. Such practices create networks of like-minded individuals that reinforce and radicalize political

bias, as well as strangle any form of diverse political discussion (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015; Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; Spohr, 2017).

Another common problem with social media is the spread of unfounded, uncorroborated, or even intentionally misleading information (fake news) through these networks. There are no checks and verification procedures for user-generated posts. It opens ways for knowingly disseminating misinformation to large number of people, easily spreading inflammatory and defamatory messages of every kind, including racist, chauvinistic, and other radical views (Spohr, 2017). Propaganda and disinformation have been used in the past by governments, societal leaders, institutions, and other political actors in order to hide the truth and provide misdirection that serves their goals. However, in the last few years the spread of fake news became a normative and prevalent way of providing untruthful knowledge (see also Krekó, this volume). Fake news undermines serious media coverage and makes it more difficult for journalists to provide truthful knowledge, and for citizens to evaluate such knowledge and act accordingly.

This new phenomenon has had a remarkable influence on societies, further undermining the legitimacy and trust in the democratic system, and especially the watchdog capacity of traditional media (the fourth branch of democracy). It normalized both extreme left-wing and right-wing views, including racism, nationalism, sexism, chauvinism, homophobia, and other unacceptable violations of democratic values and freedom of open exchange and debate.

The Effects of the Major Events, Processes, and Information

We would now like to turn to the analysis of the effects of these processes. In general, they caused the deprivation of primary human needs and the violation of values, especially particularistic ones. They led to the deprivation of the major needs of predictability, security, belongingness, self-esteem, identity, meaningfulness, or justice. In addition, they led to the violation of values such as security, tradition, and self-direction.

In general, members of society do not know when the crises will end, or when negative events will happen to them or to someone dear to them. They live in a world that doesn't always convey meaning for them. Doubts regarding their well-being in political, economic, cultural, and societal spheres figure prominently. They feel that they live in an unpredictable setting in which they experience helplessness and hopelessness. In such a context, individuals often have feelings of loss of control over the situation and loss of mastery over their fate. Of special importance is the satisfaction of epistemic human needs. Individuals try to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity by creating a comprehensible environment (see also Hogg & Goetsche-Astrup; and Kruglanski et al., this volume). Therefore, they strive to perceive and structure their world in a way that

events and people can be understood (Baumeister, 1991; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Reykowski, 1982).

Moreover, the major events we described often led to loss of personal and collective safety. Safety needs are also of great importance, as individuals strive to feel security, stability, protection, and freedom of fear and anxiety (Maslow, 1954). In addition, individuals have a need for collective-positive evaluation, respect, and esteem as individuals and members of a society, which defines their personal and social identity (Maslow, 1954; Tajfel, 1981). These events also violated the need for justice, which refers to the human tendency to believe that the world is managed by fair rules and standards (Lerner, 1970, 2003). Thus, information about speculation, corruption, and exploitation by vested interests such as bankers, business people, government, academia, mass media, politicians, and the widening gap between poor and wealthy, seriously violated the need for justice.

Many of these threats disturb the flow of normal life and cause psychological reactions such as disappointment, distress, stress, alienation, frustration, anger, fear, resentment, helplessness, hopelessness, uncertainty, loss of trust, hostility, prejudice, and estrangement—amounting to a national crisis of identity. The crises produce highly intense symbolic and realistic threats that touch various layers of human beings' life (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan et al., 2008). The effects of these experiences should be evaluated in terms of their duration, intensity, multiplicity, palpability, probability, and personal relevance (Milgram, 1986, 1993). Thus, it is possible to say that the more durable the crises, the more intense they are, the more often they occur, and the more relevant they are for the individuals. In most cases, society members cannot predict when a specific crisis will end. Thus, the negative experiences are chronic. No society member is exempt from their effect, at least vicariously.

These major events, processes, and information suggest that the democratic system is unable to fulfill its promise of satisfying the needs and values of citizens. The social "contract" has been broken and a vacuum was created. Such disappointment occurred, especially to those who have low commitment to democratic system. In situations in which society members are deprived of their basic needs, they may turn to a leader who will recognize the threats and enemies and provide a solution.

Since political vacuum never exists for long, in exactly such a situation do leaders, groups, organizations, and parties enter, which bring narratives that promise satisfaction of needs and values. Populism usually enters at this point, because the major goals of the leader are to provide messages that will ensure his ascent to power, disregarding any other consideration. The mission of persuasion and mobilization has to be carried in a clear, simple, comprehensible, and moralistic way. It should be seen as a populist narrative or as propaganda (see also Crano & Gaffney, this volume). It is always first carried via rhetoric that helps the political party and its leaders get elected. And only later, when in power, can they realize the program. The narrative always refers to the deprived needs and

the violated values. It is also based on group symbols, myths, narratives, collective memories, and heritage that appeal to personal and collective identity, culture, and worldview. Moreover, it is usually grounded in constructing threats, coming from external and internal forces that arouse fear and insecurity, and also constitute fertile ground for the presentation of the crises and the mobilization of society members. It is always selective, biased, and distorted, presenting only one-sided information and using emotional appeals to persuade and mobilize the audience. The basic point is that only the party with its leader can save the nation (Stanley, 2016).

The Emergence of Leaders and the Construction of the Satisfying Narrative

The narratives of authoritarian leaders touch on at least six major themes, which can be found in their speeches: They describe the present situation, the goals that stand before the nation, the identity of the nation, the enemies, the leaders, and the actions that have to be taken. The subthemes of every theme can vary widely in scope and relate to different issues that concern a specific nation. We will provide only a number of illustrations as examples for each theme.

The Description of the Present Situation

Description of different threats to the nation (political, economic, cultural, societal, religious, and so on), injustice done, corruption, description of external enemies that harm the nation, description of internal enemies that betray the nation.

The Goals That Stand Before the Nation

Defense of the nation from its external enemies, improving the economic situation, stopping immigration, dismantling old elites, returning to national greatness, and protecting the purity of the nation.

The Definition of "Us"

We are unique, we are strong, we are a proud nation, we have great history, heritage, and culture, we are the real patriots, we care about the nation.

The Definition of "They"

Identifying old enemies, nations that want to exploit us, the organizations that want to dictate to us, minorities, immigrants, the old system, old elites, media that disagrees with our way, legal systems that prevent the achievement of our goals, opposition that is against us and the nation.

I as the Leader

I am loyal to the nation, I am part of you, I am can bring back greatness, I am uncorrupted, I am able, I respect our history, heritage, and culture, I am a real patriot, I am a savior, I can defend us.

Examples of speeches of the following leaders provide clear examples to the presented theme: Donald Trump (<https://factba.se/transcripts/speeche>, www.rev.com/blog/transcript-category/donald-trump-transcripts); Viktor Orbán (www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches, <http://about.hungary.hu/speeches-and-remark>); Jarosław Kaczyński, (www.ft.com/content/addc05f8-d949-11e9-8f9b-77216ebe1f17, <https://notesfrompoland.com/2019/11/12/kaczynski-poland-has-historical-mission-to-support-christian-civilisation/>); or Marine Le Pen (<https://awpc.cattcenter.iastate.edu/2017/09/01/presidential-campaign-launch-march-9-2017/>, www.france24.com/en/tag/marine-le-pen/).

The populist narratives supply examples that satisfy the need for psychological structure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; see also Kruglanski et al., this volume). They provide information and motivate people for support and action. They mobilize people by providing a feeling that their needs are or will be satisfied, that the new leaders and system can be trusted and can serve as alternatives to the past or present system.

Summary

The zeitgeist of deterioration of democracy and ascendance of populist authoritarianism—as exhibited with the strengthening of the authoritarian political parties in Western Europe, in some countries in Eastern Europe, and in the US—is not new. The same trend was observed in Europe in the second and third decades of the 20th century. In both periods, through free and fair democratic elections, authoritarian parties not only increased their strength but also took power. We suggest a social psychological perspective to understand this process. This approach argues that society's members, when they encounter deprivation of their fundamental human needs and violation of their central values, are vulnerable to mobilization by political forces that promise to end their crisis by leading the society in a new direction, even if it has authoritarian characteristics and populist promises. This mobilization is especially evident among those segments of society that are less knowledgeable of, and less concerned and committed to, the democratic system.

The major conclusions of this approach are that democratic regimes have to invest much more heavily in the inculcation of democratic principles and values in their citizens and motivate and teach them how to function in times of crises, in order to defend the system against authoritarian forces. Also, the citizens have to insist on the establishment of formal and informal institutions whose goals

are protection of the democratic principles of the system and free critical media as a watch dog. The democratic system, in contrast to other regimes, needs continuous safeguarding and commitment of its citizens—their care and involvement. Without them, democracies deteriorate.

Note

1. We mostly refer to ideologically inspired terrorism, affiliated with radical Islamic ideology.

References

- Abraham, T. (2019, June 13). *What's the impact of immigration, according to Europeans and Americans?* YouGov. Retrieved from <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/06/13/whats-impact-immigration-according-europeans-and-a>
- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2020). *The narrow corridor*. New York: Penguin Random House.
- Arvanitidis, P., Economou, A., & Kollias, C. (2016). Terrorism's effects on social capital in European countries. *Public Choice*, *169*(3), 231–250. doi:10.1007/s11127-016-0370-3
- Bakshy, E., Messing, S., & Adamic, L. A. (2015). Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook. *Science*, *348*(6239), 1130. doi:10.1126/science.aaa1160
- Bar-Tal, D. (2013). *Intractable conflicts: Socio-psychological foundations and dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barberá, P., Jost, J. T., Nagler, J., Tucker, J. A., & Bonneau, R. (2015). Tweeting from left to right: Is online political communication more than an echo chamber? *Psychological Science*, *26*(10), 1531–1542. doi:10.1177/0956797615594620
- Barro, R. J. (1999). Determinants of democracy. *Journal of Political Economy*, *107*(S6), S158–S183. doi: 10.1086/250107
- Baumeister, R. F. (1991). *Meanings of life*. New York: Guilford Press.
- BBC. (2016, March 4). Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts. *BBC News*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911>
- Ben-Nun Bloom, P., Arikan, G., & Lahav, G. (2015). The effect of perceived cultural and material threats on ethnic preferences in immigration attitudes. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *38*(10), 1760–1778. doi:10.1080/01419870.2015.1015581
- Bochsler, D., & Juon, A. (2020). Authoritarian footprints in Central and Eastern Europe. *East European Politics*, *36*(2), 167–187. doi:10.1080/21599165.2019.1698420
- Boix, C., & Stokes, S. C. (2011). Endogenous democratization. *World Politics*, *55*(4), 517–549. doi:10.1353/wp.2003.0019
- Bonikowski, B. (2017). Ethno-nationalist populism and the mobilization of collective resentment. *The British Journal of Sociology*, *68*(S1), S181–S213. doi:10.1111/1468-4446.12325
- Boutyline, A., & Willer, R. (2017). The social structure of political echo chambers: Variation in ideological homophily in online networks. *Political Psychology*, *38*(3), 551–569. doi:10.1111/pops.12337
- Brader, T., Valentino, N. A., & Suhay, E. (2008). What triggers public opposition to immigration? Anxiety, group cues, and immigration threat. *American Journal of Political Science*, *52*(4), 959–978. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00353.x
- Bruneau, E., Kteily, N., & Laustsen, L. (2018). The unique effects of blatant dehumanization on attitudes and behavior towards Muslim refugees during the European “refugee

- crisis” across four countries. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 48(5), 645–662. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2357
- Burston, D. (2017). “It can’t happen here”: Trump, authoritarianism and American politics. *Psychotherapy and Politics International*, 15(1), e1399. doi:10.1002/ppi.1399
- Carpenter, S. (2010). A study of content diversity in online citizen journalism and online newspaper articles. *New Media & Society*, 12(7), 1064–1084. doi: 10.1177/1461444809348772
- Castanho, S. B. (2018). The (non)impact of the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks on political attitudes. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 44(6), 838–850. doi:10.1177/0146167217752118
- Chu, Y., Bratton, M., Lagos, M., Shastri, S., & Tessler, M. (2008). Public opinion and democratic legitimacy. *Journal of Democracy*, 19(2), 74–87. doi:10.1353/jod.2008.0032
- CNN. (2019, November 13). September 11 terror attacks fast facts. *CNN Editorial Research*.
- Cohrs, J. C., Kielmann, S., Maes, J., & Moschner, B. (2005). Effects of right-wing authoritarianism and threat from terrorism on restriction of civil liberties. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 5(1), 263–276. doi:10.1111/j.1530-2415.2005.00071.x
- Dahl, R. A. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and democracy*. London: New Haven.
- Dahl, R. A. (1989). *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior. *Psychological Inquiry*, 11(4), 227–268. doi: 10.1207/S15327965PLI1104_01
- Durkheim, E. (1897/1964). *Suicide*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Dylko, I., Dolgov, I., Hoffman, W., Eckhart, N., Molina, M., & Aaziz, O. (2017). The dark side of technology: An experimental investigation of the influence of customizability technology on online political selective exposure. *Computers in Human Behavior*, 73, 181–190. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2017.03.031>
- Earle, T. C. (2009). Trust, confidence, and the 2008 global financial crisis. *Risk Analysis*, 29(6), 785–792. doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2009.01230.x
- Echebarria-Echabe, A., & Fernández-Guede, E. (2006). Effects of terrorism on attitudes and ideological orientation. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 36(2), 259–265. doi:10.1002/ejsp.294
- Eichengreen, B., & O’Rourke, K. H. (2010, March 8). *A tale of two depressions: What do the new data tell us?* VOX: CEPR Policy Portal. Retrieved from <https://voxeu.org/article/tale-two-depressions-what-do-new-data-tell-us-february-2010-update>
- Eigner, P., & Umlauf, T. S. (2015, July 1). *The great depressions of 1929–1933 and 2007–2009: Parallels, differences and policy lessons*. Hungarian Academy of Science MTA–ELTE Crisis History Working Paper No. 2. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2612243>
- Etzioni, A. (1968). Basic human needs, alienation and inauthenticity. *American Sociological Review*, 870–885.
- Evanoff, R. J. (2004). Universalist, relativist, and constructivist approaches to intercultural ethics. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 28(5), 439–458. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2004.08.002>
- Evans, G., & Whitefield, S. (1995). The politics and economics of democratic commitment: Support for democracy in transition societies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 25(4), 485–514. doi:10.1017/S0007123400007328
- Fetzer, J. S. (2000). Economic self-interest or cultural marginality? Anti-immigration sentiment and nativist political movements in France, Germany and the USA. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 26(1), 5–23. doi:10.1080/136918300115615

- Festinger, L. (1957). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Gilbert, L., & Mohseni, P. (2011). Beyond authoritarianism: The conceptualization of hybrid regimes. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 46(3), 270. doi:10.1007/s12116-011-9088-x
- Gitlin, T. (1980). *The whole world is watching*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Godefroidt, A., & Langer, A. (2018). How fear drives us apart: Explaining the relationship between terrorism and social trust. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1–24. doi:10.1080/09546553.2018.1482829
- Goldstein, J. S. (1985). Basic human needs: The plateau curve. *World Development*, 13(5), 595–609. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X\(85\)90024-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(85)90024-5)
- Grimes, M. (2006). Organizing consent: The role of procedural fairness in political trust and compliance. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(2), 285–315. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00299.x
- Haidt, J. (2012). *The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion*. New York: Pantheon.
- Haidt, J., Graham, J., & Joseph, C. (2009). Above and below left-right: Ideological narratives and moral foundations. *Psychological Inquiry*, 20, 110–119.
- Halperin, E., & Bar-Tal, D. (2007). The fall of the peace camp in Israel: The influence of Prime Minister Ehud Barak on Israeli public opinion-July 2000–February 2001. *Conflict & Communication*, 6(2), 1–18.
- Heine, S. J., Proulx, T., & Vohs, K. D. (2006). The meaning maintenance model: On the coherence of social motivations. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 10(2), 88–110. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1002_1
- Hernandez, E., & Kriesi, H. (2016). The electoral consequences of the financial and economic crisis in Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, 55(2), 203–224. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12122
- Huddy, L., Feldman, S., Taber, C., & Lahav, G. (2005). Threat, anxiety, and support of anti-terrorism policies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(3), 593–608. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00144.x
- Inglehart, R. F., & Norris, P. (2016). Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash. *HKS Working Paper No. RWP16–026*. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659>
- Ivarsflaten, E. (2008). What unites right-wing populists in Western Europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(1), 3–23. doi:10.1177/0010414006294168
- Kaase, M. (1999). Interpersonal trust, political trust and non-institutionalised political participation in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, 22(3), 1–21. doi:10.1080/01402389908425313
- Karp, J. A., & Milazzo, C. (2015). Democratic scepticism and political participation in Europe. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 25(1), 97–110. doi:10.1080/17457289.2014.996157
- Katsambekis, G. (2017). The populist surge in post-democratic times: Theoretical and political challenges. *The Political Quarterly*, 88(2), 202–210. doi:10.1111/1467-923X.12317
- Kim, S.-H., Carvalho, J. P., Davis, A. G., & Mullins, A. M. (2011). The view of the border: News framing of the definition, causes, and solutions to illegal immigration. *Mass Communication and Society*, 14(3), 292–314. doi:10.1080/15205431003743679
- Kinder, D. R. (2003). Communication and politics in the age of information. In D. O. Sears, L. Huddy, & R. Jervis (Eds.), *Oxford handbook of political psychology* (pp. 357–393). New York: Oxford University Press.

- Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2006). Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(6), 921–956. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00644
- Kluegel, J. R., & Mason, D. S. (2004). Fairness matters: Social justice and political legitimacy in post-communist Europe. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 56(6), 813–834. doi:10.1080/0966813042000258051
- Knuckey, J., & Hassan, K. (2020). Authoritarianism and support for Trump in the 2016 presidential election. *The Social Science Journal*, 1–14. doi:10.1016/j.soscij.2019.06.008
- Kossowska, M., Trejtowicz, M., de Lemus, S., Bukowski, M., Van Hiel, A., & Goodwin, R. (2011). Relationships between right-wing authoritarianism, terrorism threat, and attitudes towards restrictions of civil rights: A comparison among four European countries. *British Journal of Psychology*, 102(2), 245–259. doi:10.1348/000712610X517262
- Kotzian, P. (2010). Public support for liberal democracy. *International Political Science Review*, 32(1), 23–41. doi:10.1177/0192512110375938
- Kroknes, V. F., Jakobsen, T. G., & Grønning, L.-M. (2015). Economic performance and political trust: The impact of the financial crisis on European citizens. *European Societies*, 17(5), 700–723. doi:10.1080/14616696.2015.1124902
- Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: “Seizing” and “freezing”. *Psychological Review*, 103(2), 263–283. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.103.2.263
- Lerner, M. J. (1970). The desire for justice and reactions to victims. In J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz (Eds.), *Altruism and helping behavior*. New York: Academic Press.
- Lerner, M. J. (2003). The justice motive: Where social psychologists found it, how they lost it, and why they may not find it again. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 7(4), 388–399. doi:10.1207/S15327957PSPR0704_10
- Lewin, K. (1947). Group decision and social change. *Readings in Social Psychology*, 3(1), 197–211.
- Lewin, K. (1951). *Field theory in social science: Selected theoretical papers*. New York: Harper Press.
- Lima, V. (2020). The effect of political crisis on citizenship rights and authoritarianism in Brazil. In V. Lima (Ed.), *Participatory citizenship and crisis in contemporary Brazil* (pp. 67–98). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
- Linz, J. J. (2000). *Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Lühiste, K. (2013). Social protection and satisfaction with democracy: A multi-level analysis. *Political Studies*, 62(4), 784–803. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12080
- Marien, S., & Hooghe, M. (2011). Does political trust matter? An empirical investigation into the relation between political trust and support for law compliance. *European Journal of Political Research*, 50(2), 267–291. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01930.x
- Marshall, R. D., Bryant, R. A., Amsel, L., Suh, E. J., Cook, J. M., & Neria, Y. (2007). The psychology of ongoing threat: Relative risk appraisal, the September 11 attacks, and terrorism-related fears. *American Psychologist*, 62(4), 304–316.
- Maslow, A. H. (1954). *Motivation and Personality*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
- Maslow, A. H. (1971). *The farther reaches of human nature*. Oxford: Viking.
- McLaren, L. M. (2003). Anti-immigrant prejudice in Europe: Contact, threat perception, and preferences for the exclusion of migrants. *Social Forces*, 81(3), 909–936. doi:10.1353/sof.2003.0038
- Metcalfe-Hough, V. (2015, October). *The migration crisis? Facts, challenges and possible solutions*. ODI Briefing, Overseas Development Institute. Retrieved from www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publicationsopinion-files/9913.pdf

- Milgram, N. A. (1986). *Stress and coping in time of war: Generalizations from the Israeli experience*. New York: Brunner–Routledge.
- Milgram, N. A. (1993). Stress and coping in Israel during the Persian Gulf War. *Journal of Social Issues*, 49(4), 103–123. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1993.tb01183.x
- Mudde, C. (2000). In the name of the peasantry, the proletariat, and the people: Populisms in Eastern Europe. *East European Politics and Societies*, 15(1), 33–53. doi:10.1177/0888325401015001004.
- Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, R. C. (2017). *Populism: A very short introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mutz, D. C. (1998). *Impersonal influence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nussbaum, M. ([1994] (2010). Patriotism and cosmopolitanism. In W. G. Brown & D. Held (Eds.), *The cosmopolitan reader* (pp. 155–162). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Oesch, D. (2008). Explaining workers' support for right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland. *International Political Science Review*, 29(3), 349–373. doi:10.1177/0192512107088390
- Oppenheim, F. E. (1971). Democracy: Characteristics included and excluded. *The Monist*, 55(1), 29–50.
- Patterson, L. A., & Koller, C. A. (2011). Diffusion of fraud through subprime lending: The perfect storm. In M. Deflem (Ed.), *Economic crisis and crime (Sociology of crime law and deviance, Volume 16)*. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing.
- Preston, J., & Archibold, R. C. (2014, June 20). U.S. Moves to stop surge in illegal immigration. *New York Times*.
- Reykowski, J. (1982). Social motivation. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 33(1), 123–154.
- Reykowski, J. (2020). *Disenchantment with democracy: A psychological perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rummens, S. (2017). Populism as a threat to liberal democracy. In C. R. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of populism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rupnik, J. (2007). Is East-Central Europe backsliding? From democracy fatigue to populist backlash. *Journal of Democracy*, 18(4), 17–25.
- Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six West European countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, 47(6), 737–765. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00784.x
- Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 25, 1–65.
- Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the content and structure of values? *Journal of Social Issues*, 50, 19–45. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1994.tb01196.x
- Schwartz, S. H. (2006). Basic human values: Theory measurement and applications. *Revue française de sociologie*, 47(4), 929–968.
- Schwartz, S. H. (2017). The refined theory of basic values. In S. Roccas & L. Sagiv (Eds.), *Values and behavior: Taking a cross cultural perspective* (pp. 51–72). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56352-7_3
- Schwartz, S. H., Cieciuch, J., Vecchione, M., Davidov, E., Fischer, R., Beierlein, C., . . . Konty, M. (2012). Refining the theory of basic individual values. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 103, 663–688. doi:10.1037/a0029393
- Shearer, E., & Grieco, E. (2019, October 2). Americans are wary of the role social media sites play in delivering the news. *Pew Research Center*. Retrieved from www.journalism.org/2019/10/02/americans-are-wary-of-the-role-social-media-sites-play-in-delivering-the-news/

- Shiller, J. R. (2019). *Narrative economics: How stories go viral and drive major economic events*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Shin, D. C. (2017). Popular understanding of democracy. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (25). doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.80
- Snow, J. (2011, September 13). Why have no bankers been arrested? *UK Channel 4 News*. Retrieved from www.channel4.com/news/by/jon-snow/blogs/bankers-arrested
- Sobczyński, M. (2019). Causes and main routes of the mass immigration to Europe in 2015. *European Spatial Research and Policy*, 26(2), 7–34.
- Spohr, D. (2017). Fake news and ideological polarization: Filter bubbles and selective exposure on social media. *Business Information Review*, 34(3), 150–160. doi:10.1177/0266382117722446
- Stanley, J. (2016). *How propaganda works*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Stephan, W. G., & Renfro, C. L. (2002). The role of threat in intergroup relations. In D. Mackie & E. Smith (Eds.), *From prejudice to intergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Stephan, W. G., Renfro, C. L., & Davis, M. D. (2008). The role of threat in intergroup relations. In U. Wagner, L. R. Tropp, G. Finchilescu, & C. Tredoux (Eds.), *Improving intergroup relations: Building on the legacy of Thomas F. Pettigrew* (pp. 55–72). Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
- Sullivan, J. L., & Transue, J. E. (1999). The psychological underpinnings of democracy: A selective review of research on political tolerance, interpersonal trust, and social capital. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 50(1), 625–650. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.50.1.625
- Sznajder, N. (2007). Hannah Arendt's Jewish cosmopolitanism: Between the universal and the particular. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 10(1), 112–122. doi:10.1177/1368431006068764
- Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human groups and social categories: Studies in social psychology*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Turner, B. S. (2002). Cosmopolitan virtue, globalization and patriotism. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 19(1–2), 45–63. doi:10.1177/026327640201900102
- Učeh, P. (2007). Parties, populism, and anti-establishment politics in East Central Europe. *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 27(1), 49–62. doi:10.1353/sais.2007.0021
- Vellenga, S. (2008). The Dutch and British public debate on Islam: Responses to the killing of Theo van Gogh and the London bombings compared. *Islam and Christian—Muslim Relations*, 19(4), 449–471. doi:10.1080/09596410802337636
- Vernon, P., & Allport, G. W. (1931). A test for personal values. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 26(3), 231–248.
- Wejnert, B. (2014). Populism and democracy: Not the same but interconnected. *Research in Political Sociology*, 22, 143–161. doi:10.1108/S0895-993520140000022006
- Wigell, M. (2008). Mapping “hybrid regimes”: Regime types and concepts in comparative politics. *Democratization*, 15(2), 230–250. doi:10.1080/13510340701846319
- Wike, R., Stokes, B., & Simmons, K. (2016, July 11). *Europeans fear wave of refugees will mean more terrorism, fewer jobs*. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/>
- Wodak, R. (2019). Entering the “post-shame era”: The rise of illiberal democracy, populism and neo-authoritarianism in Europe. *Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs*, 9(1), 195–213. doi:10.1332/204378919X15470487645420
- Wolff, E. N. (2010, March). *Recent trends in household wealth in the United States: Rising debt and the middle-class squeeze- an update to 2007*. Levy Economics Institute Working Papers Series No. 159. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1585409>