

14

**THE RISE OF POPULISM
IN THE USA****Nationalism, Race, and American
Party Politics***Leonie Huddy and Alessandro Del Ponte***The Nationalistic Turn in American Partisan Politics**

Populist parties have expanded their electoral support and increased their presence in national parliaments across western democracies in recent years, generating considerable public and scholarly attention (Mudde, 2013; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018). Populism's broad reach is evident in the successful Brexit vote, the 2016 presidential election of Donald Trump, and the entry of populist parties into government in various democratic countries, including Austria, Brazil, Hungary, India, Italy, and Poland. There is some contention surrounding the meaning of populism, but the emphasis in recent right-wing populist rhetoric on nativism and opposition to immigration underscores the central role played by nationalist ideology in shaping its policy agenda. Both populism and nationalism uphold the primacy of "the people", be it over the establishment (populism), foreigners (nationalism), or both (Brubaker, 2020). In this chapter, we focus on nationalism as a central feature of contemporary right-wing populism and consider its increased connection to support for the Republican Party in the United States (Bonikowski, 2017).

The 2016 US presidential election campaign and Trump presidency underscored the centrality of nationalism and populism to contemporary American party politics (Bartels, 2018). As Bartels (2018) notes, by 2017 Republicans were largely united around nationalistic issues such as support for building a wall on the southern border, respecting the flag, and opposing amnesty for illegal immigrants. The link between nationalism and Republican partisanship is not entirely new, however. Republicans supported these issues well in advance of Trump's presidential candidacy (Feldman, Weber, & Federico 2020; Sides, Tesler, & Vavreck, 2019). Looking back in time, the nationalistic turn in Republican Party politics was evident in the Bush administration's support of the 2003 Iraq War. It was

also on display in Congressional Republican opposition to immigration reform in 2005 (Feldman, Huddy, & Marcus 2015; Wroe 2008). Trump attracted additional support from Americans holding anti-immigration and nationalistic views in the 2016 presidential election (Reny, Collingwood, & Valenzuela, 2019; Mutz, 2018), but this was a continuation of a decade-long trend.

Nonetheless, the influence of public nationalism on Republican identification and partisan polarization has received less scholarly attention than various other social and political factors. Partisanship grounded in nationalism extends partisan conflict beyond domestic policy to include the use of military power overseas, international trade and economic relations, immigration policy, and domestic multiculturalism and deserves greater research scrutiny than it has received.

The growing partisan divide over nationalism in the US raises several questions: First, have Americans become more nationalistic over time, fueling support for the Republican Party and nationalistic candidates? Second, has nationalism become more politically relevant, mobilizing nationalists to support the Republican Party? Third, is the link between nationalism and support for the Republican Party confined to the White majority? A nation is often equated with its ethnic or racial majority, leading to lower levels of national attachment among members of non-majority groups, potentially undermining the success of nationalistic appeals among them (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997; Theiss-Morse, 2009). Even if levels of nationalism are similar among members of majority and minority groups, it may be especially appealing to White Americans because it elevates their majority status over that of ethnic and racial minorities. In support of this hypothesis, Hajnal and Rivera (2014) find that anti-immigrant sentiment has fueled White support for the Republican Party over time. Carter and Pérez (2016) also demonstrate that national pride increases anti-immigration attitudes among White Americans but has the opposite effect among Blacks. In sum, nationalism may have attracted a growing number of strongly nationalistic Whites to the Republican Party because they are more nationalistic than Blacks or nationalistic appeals have greater resonance for them.

To better understand the role of nationalism within contemporary American partisan politics, we delve briefly into the psychology of national attachments. Nationalism is only one of several different subjective attachments to a nation, but it features prominently in the rhetoric right-wing populist political parties such as the AfD in Germany, the National Rally in France, or the Swedish Democrats. In the following section, we review the crucial difference between nationalism and patriotism to explain their distinct psychological origins, correlates, and political consequences.

The Psychology of National Attachments

There is a clear distinction between patriotism and nationalism in research on national attachments (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). *Nationalism* is typically defined as a sense of “national superiority and dominance”, whereas *patriotism* is

defined as positive feelings and a sense of pride in one's country (De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003, p. 175; Osborne, Milojevic, & Sibley, 2017). It is helpful to think of this as the difference between an in-group attachment (patriotism) and out-group derogation (nationalism). The distinction is grounded in *The Authoritarian Personality*, in which the authors differentiated simple love of country, labeled as patriotism, from "blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with the prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups", termed *pseudopatriotism* (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950, p. 107). Nationalism is the intellectual heir of pseudopatriotism. In this study, we focus primarily on the link between nationalism and partisanship, but it is important to additionally consider the link between partisanship and patriotism because the two forms of national attachments are strongly related yet have differing political effects.

Nationalism reflects a sense of national superiority and is linked to heightened xenophobia, negative views of immigrants, anti-Semitism, the derogation of foreigners, classic racism, and a stronger social dominance orientation (Arieli, 2012; Blank & Schmidt, 2003). It is typically assessed by asking respondents to agree or disagree with statements such as "the world would be a better place if other countries were more like ours" (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). In contrast, patriotism influences attitudes towards one's country and co-nationals. It fosters adherence to national norms, can fuel positive attitudes towards immigrants, and generates trust in a country's institutions (Gross, Brewer, & Aday, 2009; Huddy & Del Ponte, 2019; Satherley, Yogeeswaran, Osborne, & Sibley, 2019). Patriotism is typically measured by assessing a sense of pride and positive feelings for the nation, and unlike nationalism, it does not generate out-group derogation (de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003).

The difference between nationalism and patriotism parallels another widely studied distinction between ethnonational and civic conceptions of the nation. This distinction is typically assessed in surveys by asking respondents a series of questions about the desired attitudes and behaviors of "true" or "good" citizens. In the US, Citrin and colleagues distinguish between a civic view of a true American as someone who supports the fundamental values of equality and individualism and an ethnonational view that Americans need to believe in God or have been born in the US (Citrin & Wright, 2009). Lindstam, Mader, and Schoen (2019) develop a similar distinction between ethnonational and civic understandings of what it means to be a true German. Individuals who endorse an ethnonational view of national identity share a nationalistic opposition to immigration (Citrin, Reingold, & Green, 1990; Schildkraut, 2011; Sengupta, Osborne, & Sibley, 2019). There is a similar parallel between patriotism and civic conceptions of the nation (Sibley, 2013). Those who rank highly the civic aspects of American identity are more supportive of immigration, and more inclined to think that volunteering, donating money to charity, and serving in the military

is an obligation they owe to other Americans (Citrin & Wright, 2009; Lindstam et al., 2019; Schildkraut, 2011). Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016) estimated a latent class model on the 2003/2004 International Social Survey Program – General Social Survey American national identity data and found that nationalism and ethnonational conceptions of the nation converge. In sum, ethnonational conceptions have much in common empirically with nationalism, and civic conceptions have parallel effects to those of patriotism. In this study, we combine these scales to create new scales of nationalism and patriotism in which ethnonational conceptions of the nation are included in a measure of nationalism and civic conceptions are included in a measure of patriotism.

Nationalism and Partisanship

There is no inherent ideological reason why someone who identifies strongly with the United States, feels pride in the nation, or expresses strong nationalistic sentiments should favor one or another side of politics. Indeed, in the past Americans with a strong national identity have been found equally on the political left and right (Huddy & Khatib, 2007). There is also little evidence that patriotism or nationalism exhibit ideological bias. In our past research analyzing the 1996 GSS national identity data, neither liberal–conservative ideology nor partisanship was significantly associated with national pride or nationalism (Huddy & Khatib, 2007). Symbolic patriotism (pride in being American, the flag, and anthem) is stronger on the political right than left (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1999; Karasawa, 2002). But this may have more to do with the flag than pride per se. Opposition to the Vietnam war was ultimately more common on the political left, and flag burning became synonymous with left-leaning, anti-war sentiment. There is no evidence that a more general sense of national pride or nationalism exhibit ideological bias.

There are conditions, however, in which national attachments become politicized, as seen in the example of the flag and symbolic patriotism. In research on multi-party western European democracies, we find that nationalistic opposition to the EU is more common in countries with a right-wing nationalist party (Huddy, Del Ponte, & Davies, 2020). In countries that lack a neo-nationalist party, however, the link between nationalism and EU opposition is far weaker. Moreover, the best-educated nationalists are most opposed to the EU in western European countries with a neo-nationalist political party and vote for such parties when present. The best educated citizens are more fully exposed to political rhetoric than others and can best assimilate its content, supporting the notion that partisan rhetoric politicizes nationalism (Zaller, 1992). If we extrapolate these findings to the US, they suggest that the Republican Party may have increased the link between nationalism and partisanship over time through intensified nationalistic rhetoric and policy.

Research Hypotheses and Data

We draw on data in the 1996, 2004, and 2014 GSS national identity modules to test our central hypothesis. First, we examine whether nationalism has increased in the US over time (H1), increased over time among White Americans (H1a), and is higher among White than Black Americans (H1b). Second, we examine whether the link between nationalism and Republican partisanship and Republican presidential candidate vote choice has increased over time (H2) or has increased over time among White but not Black Americans (H2a). To test these hypotheses, we first verify the empirical validity and distinctiveness of nationalism and patriotism.

Sample. The 1996, 2004, and 2014 General Social Surveys (GSS) include a national identity module developed by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Roughly half of all respondents interviewed in each year answered questions related to patriotism, nationalism, and national identity ($N = 1,367$ in 1996; $N = 1,216$ in 2004; $N = 1,274$ in 2014). All data are weighted in subsequent analyses (using the variable *wts*).

Differentiating Nationalism and Patriotism

Measurement Model. We ran confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on 23 items in the ISSP national identity module that measure nationalism and patriotism, including traditional scale items and related measures of national conceptions (ethnonational and civic). The best fit was a two-factor (nationalism and patriotism) solution, which included a methods factor for items that were asked in agree–disagree format (V17–V22) and correlated errors between items assessed on the same response scale (e.g., proud, important; all original analyses available from authors on request). Nationalism and patriotism are highly correlated in the measurement model ($r = .90$) but remain distinct. Nationalism is best defined by items such as believing that to be a good American it is important to have been born in the US, be Christian, have lived most of one's life in the country, or agree that it is better to be a citizen of the US than any other country. Patriotism is anchored by feeling proud of the armed forces, the country's political history, and the country's international sports performance plus seeing it as important to feel American in order to be a good American.

We also examined whether the measurement model worked equally well for Black and White Americans by running a set of increasingly restrictive CFAs and found that the model was invariant to race. As seen in Table A2 in the Online Appendix, it passed tests of configural, metric, and scalar invariance. We created additive scales for nationalism and patriotism. The two additive scales are more modestly correlated ($r = .50$) than in the measurement model. Each scale contains a mix of traditional and national conception items. Both scales and all analytic variables are coded 0–1 unless otherwise noted.

Determinants. Nationalism and patriotism are empirically distinct and have somewhat different determinants, as seen in Table 14.1. In these analyses, we control for patriotism when analyzing the determinants of nationalism, and vice versa, to identify their unique determinants. Nationalism is uniquely associated with being religious, not having a recent immigrant background, being female, being less well educated, having lower income, and being more conservative and authoritarian. Patriotism is uniquely associated with being male, better educated, and less authoritarian. Survey year and race also shape nationalism and patriotism, a point to which we will return. For current purposes, Table 14.1 makes clear that nationalism and patriotism attract differing kinds of adherents and, thus, constitute distinct forms of national attachment. Strong nationalists are less well-educated, less affluent, more religious, conservative, and authoritarian, whereas strong patriots are better educated and less authoritarian.

Levels of Nationalism Over Time, By Race

Our first hypothesis concerns whether nationalism has increased among Americans, or at least among White Americans, over time. In contrast to expectations that nationalism has strengthened over time, regression coefficients in Table 14.1 suggests that it has declined. The positive coefficient for 2004 and the negative coefficient for 2014 indicate that nationalism was stronger in 2004 than 1996, and weaker in 2014. There is also some suggestion that nationalism is higher among Black than White Americans (after controlling for education and income), an unexpected finding. In contrast, patriotism was stronger in 2004 (possibly linked to the ongoing Iraq War) but no stronger in 2014 than in 1996. These trends are visible in Figure 14.1, which depicts weighted means for nationalism and patriotism by year and race.

Figure 14.1 indicates that nationalism was uniformly stronger in 2004 than in 1996 for White and “other” Americans and weaker in 2014 for Whites and Blacks, suggesting a recent decrease, not increase, in nationalism. Black Americans are also slightly more nationalistic than Whites or other racial/ethnic groups at all three time points, in defiance of the notion that nationalism is higher among White Americans. Patriotism exhibits a similar trend over time among Whites, for whom patriotism increased in 2004 and then reverted to prior levels in 2014. In contrast, patriotism is lower among Blacks than Whites and remained constant among Blacks over time. In contrast to nationalism, Blacks are also less patriotic in 1996 and 2004. These findings dispel the notion that nationalism has increased in the US in recent years or that it is stronger among White than Black Americans.

Nationalism and Support for Nationalistic Policies

Before we test key hypotheses concerning a link between nationalism and support for the Republican Party, we take one last step to verify that nationalism

TABLE 14.1 Determinants of nationalism and patriotism.

	Nationalism		Patriotism	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Nationalism			0.52 (.02)***	0.50 (.02)***
Patriotism	0.46 (.02)***	0.42 (.02)***		
2004	0.02 (.01)***		0.02 (.01)***	
2014	-0.02 (.00)***	-0.02 (.00)***	0.00 (.02)	0.00 (.01)
White	-0.01 (.01)	-0.01 (.01)	0.00 (.01)	-0.01 (.01)
Black	0.03 (.01)***	0.03 (.01)**	-0.05 (.01)***	-0.05 (.01)***
Issue spending	-0.05 (.01)***	-0.01 (.01)	0.00 (.01)	-0.01 (.02)
Ideology (conservative)		0.01 (.00)***		0.00 (.00)
Authoritarianism		0.05 (.01)***		-0.02 (.01)**
Religious attendance	0.05 (.01)***	0.03 (.01)***	0.01 (.01)	-0.00 (.01)
Parent immigrant	-0.02 (.01)***	-0.01 (.01)	0.01 (.01)	-0.00 (.01)
Female	0.01 (.00)*	0.01 (.00)**	-0.02 (.00)***	-0.02 (.01)***
Age (decades)	0.01 (.00)***	0.01 (.00)***	0.01 (.00)***	0.01 (.00)***
Education (years)	-0.26 (.02)***	-0.23 (.02)***	0.11 (.02)***	0.11 (.03)***
Real Income (log)	-0.01 (.00)***	-0.01 (.00)***	0.01 (.00)***	0.00 (.00)
Constant	0.60 (.03)***	0.50 (.03)***	0.15 (.03)***	0.25 (.04)***
Observations	3,421	2,224	3,421	2,224
R-squared	0.40	0.41	0.33	0.29

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficient with standard errors in parentheses. All variables are coded 0–1 except age, education, and income. Data are weighted. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$




FIGURE 14.1 Nationalism and patriotism by year and race (weighted means).

and patriotism perform as expected. In our past research conducted in western Europe, nationalism boosted opposition to immigration while promoting support for protectionist trade and cultural policies whereas patriotism had the opposite effect, decreasing opposition to both nationalistic policies (Huddy et al., 2020). We expect nationalism to boost support for policies that reduce the influence or presence of foreigners within a country. Patriotism is likely to have the opposite effect and drive support for such policies in countries with established norms of support for free trade and immigration. During the roughly 20 years of this study,

the US qualified as a pro-immigration, free-trade nation, and thus we expect patriotism to drive support for immigration and opposition to protectionist policies.

In the GSS data, anti-immigration views are assessed by four items combined to form a reliable scale ($\alpha = .96$): Viewing immigrants as responsible for increasing crime rates, being good for the American economy, taking away jobs, and increasing or decreasing the number of immigrants. Protectionist policies are assessed with a moderately reliable scale ($\alpha = .64$) made up of four items: America should limit the import of foreign products, America should follow its own interests, foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in America, and TV should give preference to American films.

We regressed anti-immigration and protectionist views on nationalism, patriotism, and various control variables. Findings are presented in Table 14.2. There is a large, statistically significant link between nationalism and both anti-immigration and protectionist policies, as expected. Patriotism also has the expected opposite effect, promoting support for immigration. Patriotism, however, does not increase opposition to protectionist policies, suggesting weak or nonexistent norms in support of free trade.

Table 14.2 also includes an interaction between race and both nationalism and patriotism to test whether these relationships differ between Blacks and Whites. For immigration, the answer is no. Nationalism boosts and pride undermines an anti-immigration stance to the same degree for Blacks and Whites, indicating that nationalism is associated with opposition to immigration regardless of race. At low levels of nationalism, both Blacks and Whites are staunchly pro-immigration. At greater levels of nationalism, they are strongly anti-immigration. In contrast, Blacks are slightly less likely than Whites to support protectionist policies based on nationalism, but the effect of nationalism is sizeable in both racial groups. These effects vary only slightly with year. Nationalism has slightly stronger effects on support for anti-immigration policies in 2004 than in 1996 and 2014, and slightly weaker effects on protectionism in 2014 than in 1996 (see Table A3 in the Online Appendix).

In sum, nationalism performs as expected in driving support for nationalistic policies such as opposition to increased immigration, negative views of immigrants, free trade, and restricting foreign cultural influence. The effects of nationalism do not differ dramatically between Black and White Americans, suggesting that it captures antipathy to the presence and influence of foreigners regardless of race.

Nationalism, Partisanship, and Vote Choice

Partisanship. Our central question concerns the link between nationalism and Republican partisanship. Has this association increased over time in tandem with nationalistic Republican policies such as a visible anti-immigration stance? Or has it increased over time among White Americans? The answer to the latter

TABLE 14.2 Nationalism, patriotism, and support for anti-immigration and protectionist policies.


	<i>Anti-Immigration/Immigrants</i>		<i>Protectionism</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Nationalism	0.59 (.03)***	0.60 (.03)***	0.58 (.03)***	0.60 (.03)***
Patriotism	-0.25 (.03)***	-0.24 (.03)***	-0.04 (.03)	-0.04 (.03)
Black	0.03 (.02)**	0.10 (.06)	0.03 (.02)*	0.15 (.06)**
Black * nationalism		-0.08 (.08)		-0.21 (.09)**
Black * patriotism		-0.01 (.06)		0.04 (.08)
2004	-0.04 (.01)***	-0.05 (.01)***	-0.03 (.01)***	-0.04 (.01)***
2014	-0.06 (.01)***	-0.06 (.01)***	-0.02 (.01)**	-0.02 (.01)**
White	0.06 (.01)***	0.06 (.01)***	0.03 (.01)**	0.03 (.01)**
Religious attendance	-0.03 (.01)***	-0.03 (.01)***	0.00 (.01)	0.00 (.01)
Parent immigrant	-0.14 (.01)***	-0.14 (.01)***	-0.06 (.01)***	-0.06 (.01)***
Female	0.00 (.01)	0.00 (.01)	-0.01 (.01)	-0.01 (.01)
Age (categorical)	-0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)**	-0.00 (.00)*
Education (years)	-0.16 (.03)***	-0.16 (.03)***	-0.18 (.02)***	-0.17 (.03)***
Real income (log)	0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	-0.01 (.00)**	-0.01 (.00)**
Constant	0.41 (.05)***	0.40 (.05)***	0.37 (.04)***	0.36 (.04)***
Observations	3,366	3,366	3,392	3,392
R-squared	0.28	0.28	0.25	0.26

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficient with standard errors in parentheses. All variables are coded 0–1 except age, education, and income. All data are weighted. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

question is yes. In an ordered probit analysis, we regressed the 7-point standard partisanship measure, which ranges from strong Democrat to strong Republican, on nationalism, patriotism, year, race, and their interactions along with the same demographic controls included in earlier analyses (see Table A4 in the Online Appendix). The three-way interactions make coefficients difficult to interpret. We thus plotted the predicted effects of nationalism on the probability of being a strong Republican by year and race in Figure 14.2 (based on the ordered probit analysis in Table A4).

Several trends are apparent in Figure 14.2. First, nationalism is increasingly linked to a strong Republican identification over time, but only among White Americans. In 1996, there was no link between nationalism and partisanship among Whites, but there was a substantial link in 2004 and 2014 (Panel A). This provides evidence that nationalism and partisanship have become associated over time among White Americans. Moreover, the probability of being a strong Republican is sizeable among the strongest nationalists. In the 2014 GSS sample, the probability of being a strong Republican was roughly .03 among the weakest and .25 among the strongest nationalists. In additional analyses (not shown here), in which the dependent variable was simply being a Republican (regardless of strength), nationalism was linked to Republicanism among Whites in all three

Panel A. White Americans



Panel B. Black Americans




FIGURE 14.2 Nationalism and the probability of strong Republican identification by race and year.

years, although its effects were substantially larger in 2014 than in 1996 or 2004. This suggests that the association between nationalism and Republicanism has increased over time, as has the link with strong Republican partisanship.

There is no evidence, however, that nationalism drives support for the Republican Party among Black Americans. As seen in Panel B, the probability of being a strong Republican is unrelated to nationalism among Blacks in all years. Moreover, the probability of someone being a strong Republican is lower among Blacks than Whites regardless of level of nationalism. Indeed, the probability of being a strong Republican is close to 0 among those scoring higher than .5 on the nationalism measure. Similar findings are observed for analyses that predict being Republican, Independent, or Democratic. In 2014, the probability of being a Republican was .06 among highly nationalistic African Americans compared to .66 among comparable nationalistic Whites.

Vote Choice. In the GSS, Americans were asked who they had voted for in the previous presidential election. In 1996, the question referred to the 1992 election (George H. Bush vs Bill Clinton); in 2004, it referred to 2000 (George W. Bush vs. Al Gore); and in 2014, it referred to 2012 (Mitt Romney vs. Barack Obama). The Republican won in 2000 and the Democrat in 1992 and 2012. The percent who reported voting in the past election was 66% (1996), 64% (2004), and 65% (2014), and analyses of vote choice are based on this reduced sample ($N = 2,418$). Voting for the Republican candidate was regressed on nationalism, patriotism, race, year, their interactions, and demographic controls (Table A5 in the Online Appendix). In these analyses, nationalism boosted support for the Republican candidates in all three elections and had substantially stronger effects in 2004 (the 2000 election) and 2014 (the 2012 election) than in 1996 (1992 election). Once again, these effects are largely confined to White Americans (Table A5).

To more clearly depict the effects of nationalism on vote choice among Whites across the three elections, the predicted values of voting for the Republican candidate are plotted in Figure 14.3 across the range of nationalism by year for Whites (based on analyses in Table A5). As seen in this figure, nationalism increases support for the Republican candidate in all years, although its effects are far more pronounced in 2004 and 2014 than in 1996. At the highest levels of nationalism, the probability that White Americans voted for the Republican candidate was roughly .8 in the most recent two presidential elections. In contrast, Whites low in nationalism were relatively unlikely to vote for the Republican presidential candidate.

The reduced sample of African American voters made it difficult to accurately depict the same relationship for Blacks. We can, however, plot the predicted probability of the Black and White Republican vote in all three elections combined. Those trends are depicted in Figure 14.4 (based on Table A5). Figure 14.4 makes clear that support for the Republican presidential candidate increases dramatically across the range of nationalism for Whites, whereas it has little effect among Black voters. Once again, confidence intervals are large and estimates




FIGURE 14.3 Nationalism and probability of Republican vote among Whites by year.

Taylor & Francis
Not for distribution




FIGURE 14.4 Nationalism and probability of Republican vote by race (all three years).

imprecise at the lowest levels of nationalism among Blacks, but the probability that no Black voter supported the Republican candidate is a possible outcome. The starkest contrast in Republican voting exists between Black and White voters at the highest levels of nationalism. The probability of a highly nationalistic White voter supporting the Republican candidate is roughly .68 compared to .03 among a highly nationalistic Black voter.

The Political Effects of Patriotism


So far, we have largely focused on the political effects of nationalism. We included patriotism in all analyses, and it is important to contrast its political effects with those of nationalism. Despite being highly correlated, the two forms of national attachment have differing effects, as noted earlier in the discussion of anti-immigration policies.

We did not begin with strong hypotheses concerning the effects of patriotism on partisanship and vote choice. Some past studies have reported a link between symbolic patriotism and political conservatism, but in other studies, in which patriotism is measured independently of questions about the flag and anthem, there is no political bias. In the GSS data, patriotism is largely non-partisan, as seen in regression analyses included in the appendix (Table A4). In these tables, patriotism has a significant positive relationship with Republican partisanship in 2004 but not in other years. Moreover, this does not differ significantly by race. The heightened effects of patriotism on Republican support in 2004 can be seen in Panel A of Figure 14.5, which plots the probability of being a strong Republican across the range of patriotism among Blacks and Whites combined. The same trend is observed in analysis of Republican vote choice. Patriotism is not significantly linked to vote choice except in 2004, and this does not differ by race. Panel B of Figure 14.5 demonstrates the greater effect of patriotism on Republican vote choice in 2004 than in other years.

By Year (Blacks and Whites Combined)

We did not expect patriotism to boost Republican identification and vote choice in 2004 and have no way to determine what enhanced its effects in that year. One possibility is that the ongoing Iraq War, initiated by a Republican administration, inspired patriotic support for Republicans in 2004. The 2004 GSS survey occurred just a few years after the 9/11 terror attacks and the Bush administration had argued that a war in Iraq was necessary to reduce the chances of future terrorism and the threat posed to the US by Saddam Hussein. Obviously, this could not explain patriots' support for Bush in the 2000 election (Figure 14.5B), but retrospective measurement of past vote is notoriously inaccurate and often colored by subsequent events.

Panel A. Republican Partisanship



Panel B. Republican Vote Choice




FIGURE 14.5 Patriotism, Republican ID, and Republican vote.

Importantly, the trends depicted in Figure 14.5 make clear that nationalism and patriotism have differing effects on partisanship and support for Republican presidential candidates. Nationalism appears increasingly linked over time to Republican partisanship among White Americans, a trend that likely strengthened in 2016. But it has no effect on partisanship among Black Americans. In contrast, the link between patriotism and partisanship is more episodic and similar across racial groups. When the country is threatened, an administration that responds with force will attract patriotic support. This implies that patriotism could lend support equally to the Democratic or Republican Party depending on the political circumstances.

Conclusion

The recent growth of right-wing populist political parties in western democracies has drawn attention to nationalism, a common feature of the populist political agenda in which the national ethnic majority (equated with “the people”) is pitted against elite forces that promote diversity, globalization, and multiculturalism (Brubaker, 2020). This raises a pertinent question about whether the success of populism is due to rising levels of nationalism. Our research and that of others suggests this is not the case (Bonikowski, 2017; Huddy et al., 2020). The GSS data analyzed in the current study demonstrates that, if anything, nationalism was lower in the US in 2014 than in 2004. Levels of nationalism have also remained relatively constant in western European countries in recent years. Instead of rising nationalism, the success of populist parties can be traced to their support for nationalistic policies such as opposition to immigration or the imposition of trade tariffs to undercut free trade. Our findings are consistent with other research showing that political rhetoric is needed to translate societal trends, such as an increase in the immigrant population, into policy attitudes (Bruter, 2003; Hopkins, 2010). In the case of populism, economic and cultural threats to the majority ethnic group may further heighten the political resonance of nationalistic rhetoric (Bonikowski, 2017).

The clear caveat to our findings, however, is the limited appeal of the Republican Party for strongly nationalistic Black Americans. There is no question that nationalism measures the same thing for White and Black Americans. Regardless of race, nationalistic Whites and Blacks oppose increased immigration, hold negative views of immigrants, and support protectionist policies. The key difference is that nationalistic Whites, but not Blacks, have moved to support the Republican Party over time. What explains Black indifference to the Republican Party’s appeal to nationalism? One very likely explanation, but one we could not test in the current study, is that the Democratic Party is associated with support whereas the Republican Party is viewed as hostile to Black interests, generating strong group norms of Black Democratic identification (Grossman & Hopkins, 2016; White, Laird, & Allen, 2014). This is a potential downside of nationalistic rhetoric, which elevates the majority ethnic group over racial and

ethnic minorities. The same process may occur in other western democracies that contain sizeable minority groups. There, too, minority status may conflict with personal nationalistic tendencies, limiting the political appeal of nationalism and populist parties.

Finally, we need to underscore the differing political effects of distinct forms of national attachments in the US and elsewhere. Despite their positive association, nationalism and patriotism have opposing political effects. In the US, nationalism promotes opposition to immigration, increases support for trade protectionism, and boosts White support for the Republican Party over time, whereas patriotism promotes support for immigration and increases opposition to trade protectionism across racial lines. We find similar trends in western Europe, where strong nationalism fuels opposition to immigration, free trade policies, and the EU, and promotes electoral support for populist parties, whereas patriotism strengthens support for the same policies and the EU (Huddy et al., 2020).

In conclusion, our findings call into question the future success of nationalist populist partisan appeals within mainstream American politics and other western nations. To date, nationalism has had limited appeal in western democracies, and the success of anti-establishment parties has been limited (Mudde, 2013; Norris, 2005). As Mudde (2013) points out:

Despite some striking high and recent results, the alleged populist right “wave” is clearly not lapping (equally) at the shores of all West European countries. In fact, PRRPs [populist radical right parties] are represented in the national parliaments of just half of the 17 West European countries. (2013, p. 3)

Mudde argues that anti-establishment parties remain excluded from “the more than 200 national governments that have been formed in Western Europe since 1980” (Mudde, 2013, p. 4). That assessment has changed slightly in recent years with anti-establishment parties entering government in Italy (2018) and Austria (2017) and making inroads into the European parliament.

Nationalistic appeals have had greater success in the US. Donald Trump won the 2016 election with a strongly nationalistic platform and slogan: Make America Great Again. But findings in the current study make clear that nationalistic appeals are only successful among White Americans. As the US population diversifies in coming years, the success of a nationalistic appeal is likely to decline. Of course, time will tell. But the need for national unity has become glaringly obvious amidst the coronavirus pandemic, tilting the playing field towards unifying patriotic rather than divisive nationalistic political appeals.

References

- Adorno, T., Frenkel-Brunswick, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). *The authoritarian personality*. New York: Harper.

- Ariely, G. (2012). Globalization, immigration and national identity: How the level of globalization affects the relations between nationalism, constructive patriotism and attitudes toward immigrants? *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 15(4), 539–557.
- Bartels, L. M. (2018). Partisanship in the Trump era. *The Journal of Politics*, 80(4), 1483–1494.
- Blank, T., & Schmidt, P. (2003). National identity in a United Germany: Nationalism or patriotism? An empirical test with representative data. *Political Psychology*, 24, 289–312.
- Bonikowski, B. (2017). Ethno-nationalist populism and the mobilization of collective resentment. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 68(S1), S181–S213.
- Bonikowski, B., & DiMaggio, P. (2016). Varieties of American popular nationalism. *American Sociological Review*, 81(5), 949–980.
- Brubaker, R. (2020). Populism and nationalism. *Nations and Nationalism*, 26(1), 44–66.
- Bruter, M. (2003). Winning hearts and minds for Europe: The impact of news and symbols on civic and cultural European identity. *Comparative Political Studies*, 36(10), 1148–1179.
- Carter, N. M., & Pérez, E. O. (2016). Race and nation: How racial hierarchy shapes national attachments. *Political Psychology*, 37(4), 497–513.
- Citrin, J., Reingold, B., & Green, D. P. (1990). American identity and the politics of ethnic change. *Journal of Politics*, 52(4), 1124–1154.
- Citrin, J., & Wright, M. (2009). Defining the circle of we: American identity and immigration policy. *The Forum*, 7(3).
- De Figueiredo, R. J. P., & Elkins, Z. (2003). Are patriots bigots? An inquiry into the vices of in-group pride. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(1), 171–188.
- Devos, T., & Banaji, M. R. (2005). American = White? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 88(3), 447.
- Feldman, S., Huddy, L., & Marcus, G. E. (2015). *Going to war in Iraq: When citizens and the press matter*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Feldman, S., Weber, C., & Federico, C. (2020). Authoritarianism and the Structure of American Partisanship. Unpublished Ms.
- Gross, K., Brewer, P. R., & Aday, S. (2009). Confidence in government and emotional responses to terrorism after September 11, 2001. *American Politics Research*, 37(1), 107–128.
- Grossmann, M., & Hopkins, D. A. (2016). *Asymmetric politics: Ideological republicans and group interest democrats*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hajnal, Z., & Rivera, M. U. (2014). Immigration, Latinos, and white partisan politics: The new democratic defection. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4), 773–789.
- Hopkins, D. J. (2010). Politicized places: Explaining where and when immigrants provoke local opposition. *American Political Science Review*, 104(1), 40–60.
- Huddy, L., & Del Ponte, A. (2019). National identity, pride, and chauvinism—their origins and consequences for globalization attitudes. In G. Gustavsson & D. Miller (Eds.), *Liberal nationalism and its critics: Normative and empirical questions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Huddy, L., Del Ponte, A., & Davies, C. (2020). *Nationalism, patriotism, and support for the EU*. Unpublished Ms.
- Huddy, L., & Khatib, N. (2007). American patriotism, national identity, and political involvement. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1), 63–77.
- Hurwitz, J., & Peffley, M. (1999). International attitudes. In J. P. Robinson, P. R. Shaver, & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), *Measures of political attitudes* (pp. 533–590). San Diego: Academic Press.

- Karasawa, M. (2002). Patriotism, nationalism, and internationalism among Japanese citizens: An etic—emic approach. *Political Psychology*, 23(4), 645–666.
- Kosterman, R., & Feshbach, S. (1989). Toward a measure of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes. *Political Psychology*, 10(2), 257–274.
- Lindstam, E., Mader, M., & Schoen, H. (2019). Conceptions of national identity and ambivalence towards immigration. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1–22.
- Mudde, C. (2013). Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what? *European Journal of Political Research*, 52(1), 1–19.
- Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2018). Studying populism in comparative perspective: Reflections on the contemporary and future research agenda. *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(13), 1667–1693.
- Mutz, D. C. (2018). Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 115(19), 4330–4339.
- Norris, P. (2005). *Radical right: Voters and parties in the electoral market*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Osborne, D., Milojev, P., & Sibley, C. G. (2017). Authoritarianism and national identity: Examining the longitudinal effects of SDO and RWA on nationalism and patriotism. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 43(8), 1086–1099.
- Reny, T. T., Collingwood, L., & Valenzuela, A. A. (2019). Vote switching in the 2016 election: How racial and immigration attitudes, not economics, explain shifts in White voting. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 83(1), 91–113.
- Satherley, N., Yogeewaran, K., Osborne, D., & Sibley, C. G. (2019). Differentiating between pure patriots and nationalistic patriots: A model of national attachment profiles and their socio-political attitudes. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 72, 13–24.
- Schildkraut, D. J. (2011). *Americanism in the twenty-first century: Public opinion in the age of immigration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sengupta, N. K., Osborne, D., & Sibley, C. G. (2019). On the psychological function of nationalistic “whitelash”. *Political Psychology*, 40(4), 759–775.
- Sibley, C. G. (2013). Social dominance and representations of the national prototype: The exclusionary emphasis hypothesis of national character. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 37(2), 212–224.
- Sidanius, J., Feshbach, S., Levin, S., & Pratto, F. (1997). The interface between ethnic and national attachment: Ethnic pluralism or ethnic dominance? *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 61(1), 102–133.
- Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2019). *Identity crisis: The 2016 presidential campaign and the battle for the meaning of America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Theiss-Morse, E. (2009). *Who counts as an American? The boundaries of national identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- White, I. K., Laird, C. N., & Allen, T. D. (2014). Selling out? The politics of navigating conflicts between racial group interest and self-interest. *American Political Science Review*, 108(4), 783–800.
- Zaller, J. R. (1992). *The nature and origins of mass opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.