

The Birthing, Nurturing, and Evolution of Dystopian Groups

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In this chapter, we focus our attention on close knit affinity groups, which share a common identity, ideology, goals, and most often a common leader, the group's prototype, who exemplifies the vision of the group, and often is given leeway to deviate from group norms under appropriate circumstances, sometimes with disastrous results.¹ These groups can range in size, with some consisting of a small number of disgruntled partisans plotting to change the local library board to a mass of angered activists encompassing a large portion of the populace of a state or nation. In our analysis, size is of little consequence, except that very large groups often can wreak considerably more havoc than their smaller brethren. Almost all emergent groups begin small, and some morph into the majority, though this is rare and usually does not bode well for the former "rulers." When groups which had been in the minority gain social or political power, they can create considerable misery for the former majority (Crano, 2012; Prislin et al., 2011).

This chapter is concerned with the methods of communication and persuasion commonly used by leaders in forming and maintaining power in affinity groups and on the way such (usually smaller and less powerful) groups fashion persuasive messages to influence the larger, more powerful collective (herein termed the majority) to accede to its wishes. We focus particularly on how the weaponization of social identity motives by extremist viewpoints,

¹ Some believe the word "tribe" has a specific, almost sacred meaning, referring to indigenous communities and cultures, and that it should be reserved solely for these purposes. Accordingly, despite this monograph's title, we have refrained from this usage and instead use the term close-knit affinity group to refer to the kinds of assemblages with which we are concerned.

combined with consistent, persistent, and uncompromising messaging can drive an irreconcilable wedge between groups and move entire collectives to hardened, often extremist positions that leave no room for compromise. The outcomes of such contests are often not foreseeable. History from Marx to Hitler to Father Coughlin to Donald Trump provide ample examples of this fundamental minority-based method of influence. Although their views often were judged absurd and ridiculous, using research and theory drawn from the related perspectives of minority group influence, persuasion, and the social identity perspective elucidates the conditions under which seemingly deviant perspectives of a “voice crying out in the wilderness” can gain and motivate adherents to coalesce, and help develop close knit affinity groups defined in large part by their antagonistic relationship with mainstream groups, and which are formed and maintained by the interaction of social identity concerns with the processes of social influence and persuasion. In our scheme, there are three main factors that need be considered in understanding the critical nature of the interaction between nascent, developing affinity groups and the persuasive glue that sometimes tames the inertia that keeps them from flying apart. These factors are concerned with features of the *audience*, the *leader*, and the *context*. When disentangling the roots of deviant developing affinity groups, which sometimes capture the mainstream’s prerogatives to the dismay of the former ruling class (Prislin et al., 2011), all three components require immediate and close consideration.

The Audience

The first of these components to be discussed has to do with the audience. Who are the people who fall under the influence, or are victimized, by aberrant leaders whose promise to lead them to nirvana often leads to undesirable, even horrific outcomes? The example of Jim Jones and the Peoples Temple, whose more than 900 whose members committed suicide or were

murdered by the leader's fanatical followers comes to mind, and clearly illustrates the power of the leader and features of the evolving social situation in which such groups are born, nurtured, and mutate.² All too often, however, the minor players, the leader's followers and the features of the social context are relegated to mere walk-on roles. This is a mistake, because to understand fully the power of deviant affinity groups, it is important to understand the actors who fill in the roles of "extras," because they are the necessary cannon fodder that allow leaders to proselytize and form small groups of adherents, who then draw attention from originally unaffiliated onlookers. With all of this in place, leaders ultimately execute their will on susceptible individuals who have coalesced to constitute the group whose members come to identify themselves in terms of the leader's vision of reality. Successful leaders of aberrant affinity out-groups all share two basic and necessary talents – the ability to recognize discontented and psychologically damaged or vulnerable individuals, and the capacity to form these individuals into a coherent group whose social identities are in large part shaped by the leader's ideas of their (and sometimes the group's) ultimate destiny. This is not to say that such leaders *force* themselves onto the group, rather they create members' allegiance through their shared identity with their followers. It would indeed be problematic to take autonomy from the hands of followers in terms of the actions they take on behalf of their group and leader – this style of leadership is one grounded in influence and relies on providing freedom and a license to act creatively on behalf of the group and their interpretation of the leader's desires (Haslam et al., 2022).

² Jim Jones is far from the only leader whose ideas and charisma led many followers to death and destruction. The Kanungu cult in Uganda was responsible for more than 900 deaths, the mass suicides of at least 39 members of the Heaven's Gate cult near San Diego, California, and the recent self-starvation of at least 47 members of Kenya's Good News International Church attest to the power of a leader to lead members of a flock to its own demise. These are but a small sample of the power of individuals to persuade their followers to make the ultimate sacrifice in exchange for a more desirable outcome, usually eternal life.

The Tea Party. There is much to be learned from the study of successful (formerly dystopian) affinity groups, as well as from those that failed (see Crano & Gaffney, 2020).

In general, many of the factors that give rise to populist groups also appear at work in the birth of dystopian affinity groups, which often share some major features of populist movements. There often is a sense of relative deprivation (RD) in both types of groups that involves not an absolute loss of status or influence, but the *perception* that their relative loss portends the beginning of a long-term decline in quality of life (Uysal et al., 2022). For some of these groups, the reality may be close to the perception, but in other instances the perception bears little resemblance to reality. A recent example of the difference between absolute and relative deprivation is found in a comparison of the rise of the Tea Party movement during Barack Obama's presidency, and the contemporaneous Occupy Wall Street short-lived uprising.³ The Tea Party initially focused on issues of taxation, but given the political predilections of its membership, objections came to include government overreach, grievances about depredations of immigrants allegedly storming their castles, and the rise of the underclass, largely populated by people of color who were seen as being unfairly advantaged by a Black President and his so-called government bail-out programs during and following the economic crisis of 2018. The largely middle-aged middle-income middle-of-the-road conservative converts to the considerably more extremist Tea Party found an outlet for the collective's fear that the country had left them behind, and as a result the movement sprung to life considerably more rapidly than had other such movements in the past. The party was abetted by two relatively novel phenomena (at least for this group), the power of the internet to facilitate the spread of information (rallies, conspiracies, membership drives, calendars of events), and the willing acceptance (if sometimes

³ The Tea Party grew from a news commentator's call for a Chicago Tea Party, harkening back to the original Tea Party in Boston that also was inspired by the common consensus that taxes were excessive.

by a nod and a wink) of the weakened but still powerful Republican party hierarchy, which saw the movement as a way regain power. The Tea Party ultimately drove the GOP to shift further to the right. The Tea Party's presence in the GOP illustrates a classic self-categorization paradigm, in which a distinct (and extreme) ingroup faction can be used by the majority of the group to move away from a rival outgroup (Democrats). This creates not only temporary change, but dramatic overall changes to the group identity by polarizing aspects of the group's prototype (Gaffney et al., 2014). While the Tea Party could not be viewed as responsible for making a political neophyte the head of the Republican Party and the President of the United States, they did help pave the way for these outcomes.

Occupy Wall Street. A movement contemporaneous with the rise of the Tea Party was the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) crusade, sometimes described as a movement in the making. The OWS is a comparative foil to the Tea Party, including consideration of its lasting effects (or not), because it provides a case study of the critical nature of the leader in the coalescence phase of group development. OWS grew from a more or less spontaneous protest generated by the contention that 1% of the US populous controlled 99% of the country's wealth. This struck many (those not in the 1%) as indefensible if not immoral and prompted the call for major restructuring of the economic system, a call that rang throughout the country. OWS "headquarters" (i.e., where the bulk of media attention was directed) was found in a group that encamped near Wall Street, a symbol of all that was wrong with the lopsided distribution of the country's wealth.

OWS was interesting because the most identifiable participants in the movement consisted of young people who appeared on the verge of leaving the protected environment of the university and entering the wild world of work. Unfortunately, the economics of the time did not appear to welcome new recruits to the sad realities involved in making a mark, or at least,

making a living. This group appeared inspirationally upwardly mobile but stymied by the economic downturn of the time, and the job rejection notes from potential employers hit them as hard as might be expected. The uncertainty and self-doubt that accompanied their rejection was as threatening as Dad's inability to meet next year's country club dues because of economic reversals. At a minimum, he might have told junior that to succeed, a movement needed a leader with some degree of charisma, who could make a clear articulation of goals, and stick to that message. There's the rub. OWS had no clear message, other than "we want ours, and maybe some for you other people too," and even that message was rarely enunciated with any degree of clarity or conviction. And though it has worked in the past, rarely, privileged kids decrying the fate of the poor is not usually a successful rhetorical position, especially when enunciated by those who've rarely even met a poor person.

The sad fate of the OWS is not that its leader could not craft a message that resonated with a large swath of the population. Approximately 99% of the country could be counted on to consider the movement's message. The problem is that there was no leader, and no coherent message. Without this, the movement was not recognizable, even to its own supporters. This is not circumstances that inspire a movement, but rather akin to watching a slow motion train wreck. Predictably, the movement collapsed because of its inadequacies in fulfilling the central features of group development.

The Peoples Temple. This is not to suggest that members of aberrant affinity group are never on the wrong side of the economic eight-ball. Followers of Jim Jones and his Peoples Temple were considerably less well off than San Francisco's bourgeoisie, where most Templers lived. But the sense of futility of ever rising from the depths of abject poverty was a potent stimulus for dissatisfaction with the status quo and a search for some way of making things better

for themselves, their families, and their friends. The search was real because the effects of their status were felt immediately and daily. Although not all, but the bulk of the Peoples Temple membership consisted of men and women who in terms of economic status had little to lose. For many, the Peoples Temple seemed to offer a way out, perhaps the only way out. But improvements in the lives of the members never seemed to materialize, and some relief from living on the edge, arguably a necessary condition for development of actions to produce positive change, were largely nonexistent. Their lives involved more a search for survival than self-actualization. In terms of their response to their plight, the RD they felt was obviously real, but the way out was not apparent, except that provided by Jim Jones – salvation or death by suicide or murder. Ultimately the allure of a strong, charismatic leader with a clear vision for the Peoples Temple's destiny provided Jones' followers with meaning and esteem and supplied Jones with astronomical influence in this life, which he used to take his flock to the next. Perhaps Jones, too, could not discern a way out for his church, or himself, perhaps he was insane, perhaps he believed the vision he had created, that they all were about to be moved to camps, perhaps he did not wish to carry on, and could not abandon his followers, so he took them with him. Arguably, a similar sense of futility characterized many of the actors in the Tea Party and the OWS movements, but in real terms, their economic plight was far from desperate. Most of the members of these groups had too much to lose to respond to a Jim Jones-like call to end it all.

In each of these apparently disparate case studies, the common theme of RD is seen. In understanding the unique role of RD in explicating aberrant results, Pettigrew (2015) in his appreciation of Samuel Stouffer, drew four requirements, the first being that RD is an individual, not a group-level response used to make inferences about individual behavior (Stouffer, 1940, 1962; Stouffer et al., 1949a, 1949b). In RD, Pettigrew argued, individuals make cognitive

comparisons of their lot relative to other referent groups, these appraisals then lead to the conclusion that they or their group is being unfairly disadvantaged, which leads to angry resentment. "If any one of these three requirements is not met, RD is not operating (Smith et al., 2012)" (Pettigrew, 2016, p. 9).

Individuals undergoing RD experience in turn three psychological processes: (1) they make cognitive comparisons, (2) after which follow cognitive appraisals that they or their ingroup are disadvantaged, and (3) that these disadvantages are unfair and arouse angry resentment. To this we might add a common feature of RD, which it is most likely to develop not when conditions are at their worst, but rather after a short improvement, or one that raises hopes, which then are dashed when progress appears fragile and impermanent (Smith et al., 2012).

The Leader

Over the years, perhaps no topic in the study of organizations has received more attention than leadership. This is understandable, as leaders can have a major effect on the success or failure of their groups, whether it is a growing religious organization, an established Fortune 500 company, or a struggling political party. Leaders do not exist without followers, and they do not exist without groups. Effective leaders need not wield the power to dominate their groups into submission or to do their beckoning (although some do). Rather, the hallmark of effective leadership is the leader's ability to influence the group. Intelligence, charisma, attractiveness are all beneficial features; but the quality that puts influence directly into the hands of the leader and influences followers' perceptions of those beneficial features is the leader's position in the group – the leader's prototypicality.

Prototypes are shared attributes among group members (e.g., opinions, clothing, slang) that provide information about features that group members have in common and also what makes

them different from relevant outgroups. Most members of the Republican Party in the United States share specific attributes (e.g., anti-abortion sentiment, the desire to cut federal spending) – these shared qualities set them apart from members of the Democratic Party. The extent to which someone embodies the group prototype predicts their influence within the group (Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003; Reicher & Hopkins, 2003). Importantly, group prototypes and thus those who most closely approximate them are not merely “modal” group members – often they are idealized exemplars that the group can use to provide a group definition that stands in stark contrast to a relevant outgroup’s position (Turner et al., 1987). This means that what is prototypical is context specific and changes with respect to variations in the outgroup and the social field. Sometimes, George W. Bush is prototypical of the GOP, but changes to both the GOP and the Democratic Party means that sometimes Donald J. Trump is prototypical of the Republican Party.

Prototypical group members are the source of influence within their groups – group members look to them for important information that both denotes the boundaries between groups and describes the normative features of their groups. To this extent, this allows prototypical group members also to prescribe the normative features of the group, which gives them disproportionate influence to enact changes to the group (Seyranian et al., 2008; Syfers et al., 2022). Once they occupy this position, a demagogic strategy to retain this position is to continue to polarize the group away from the outgroup. It behooves demagogues to continuously extremize their groups because clearly defining the features that make the ingroup distinct from a relevant outgroup while simultaneously inciting member uncertainty ensures that leader’s grip on the group prototype.

Inducing feelings of unequal treatment [relative deprivation] at the hands of an identifiable enemy is a simple and effective way to induce member uncertainty. This puts the leader at the helm of whomever the group is fighting (e.g., Jews, Capitalists, Commies, Soros). Extremizing the group away from a relevant outgroup (i.e., those depriving us) helps to secure the leader's position (Gaffney et al., 2014). In such situations, members crave a cohesive ingroup that easily contrasts to an outgroup, just as the leader is creating. In an "I alone can fix it" fashion, the leader is now essentially the solution to members' uncertainty. These things are accomplished through revisionist history, in which leaders can redefine history to fit with their canon. This tactic even succeeds when the ink is still fresh on the latest outrage headline.

Much of this came to light in the storming of the US Capitol on January 6, 2021. Haslam and colleagues (2021) argued that for months before the insurrection, Trump had effectively whipped up his supporters into a rage at those denying them their democratic basic right to emplace their preferred choice into the job (POTUS). However, in this, Trump was not solely responsible; importantly, he never once had to utter orders to the people who brutalized Capitol police, took lives, and destroyed parts of the historic US Capitol in their rage. The insurrectionists acted on their own volition and did so on behalf of an identity and leader that they felt was gravely wronged. Trump's role in this was to provide his supporters with the tools to feel that they *could* and *should* act creatively on his behalf against those responsible for robbing them of their rights.

The Context

Typically, feelings of RD trigger anger and resentment (e.g., Smith et al., 2012; Smith & Kessler, 2004), a common factor seen in the development of many different close-knit affinity groups. As Cena et al. (2022) observed, "Relative deprivation reinforces subjective perceptions

of economic vulnerability and leads to strategies aimed at reducing perceptions of injustice and disadvantage, such as voting for a populist party (Spruyt et al., 2016).”

To the twin RD outcomes of anger and resentment we add desperation, which also may play a role in many actors’ common response to RD, which is to “lie flat” (Zheng et al., 2022; see also Zhang et al., 2022). The term is used in some societies to indicate the so-inclined individual’s desire to do nothing – to lie flat – in the face of adversity, with little attempt to improve matters. The lie flat movement is a source of consternation in China, “It is necessary to prevent the stagnation of the social class, unblock the channels for upward social mobility, create opportunities for more people to become rich, and form an environment for improvement in which everyone participates, avoiding involution and lying flat,” (Xi Jin Ping, Paramount Leader of the People’s Republic of China, as quoted on October 15 by the Communist Party’s flagship journal on political theory, *Qiushi*). Lying flat appears the result of the perceived helplessness of individuals to make their lives better by working harder. Apparently, many have tried and failed at this, and so have moved to the other extreme of the ambition scale, that is, no ambition. These are not the kind of people who join movements, at least those movements that involve work.

At the other extreme are those motivated by RD seek out groups to help them overcome the outcome they perceive as lying in wait for them. These individuals are not like the more youthful lying flat group, but rather are those who are reasonably well-off and willing to change the system they view as responsible for diminished prospects (perceived RD). Considerable research has shown these individuals tend to move in a more radical, right-wing extremist direction (Carrillo et al., 2011; Cena et al., 2022; Lubbers et al., 2002; Spruyt et al., 2016).

In this case, the desperation is probably less justified and more a figment of the holders’ collective imaginations – but that is largely irrelevant. The birth of many populist movements

was the result of a sense on the part of the affected individuals who connect with and occupy the dystopian group that things are bad and getting worse (Crano & Gaffney, 2020). Past research has suggested a shared sense of relative deprivation (RD) among the group's adherents appears a necessary feature for the formation of such groups (Carillo et al., 2011; Moghaddam, 2008; Pettigrew, 2002, 2015). Pettigrew (2015) argued that RD was based on perceptions of status or identity loss, and the resultant anger in response. The perception of decline need not meet the standard metrics. What matters is the sense that the future looks much bleaker than originally conceived, and that unfair and unjustified loss generates not just anger and resentment, but a sense of desperation to stop the decline (Smith & Kessler, 2004; Smith & Pettigrew, 2015). For some, the decline is well founded. Late-middle aged assembly line workers whose car company moves from their life-long homes in Michigan to Kentucky have every right to feel desperate. Because of the changes they are experiencing, their prospects have shrunk dramatically. The economy has left them out, and their options are extremely limited – lie flat, or join in some form of cultural backlash toward social change. These near social inevitabilities supply the backbone of many populist platforms, and support Inglehart and Norris' (2017) thesis, which suggests that changes to a country's economy that "leaves out" some workers will stimulate the kinds of extreme responses witnessed in the rise of many social movements, but the extreme responses are stimulated at the level of the individual, not the group. Group formation based on this sense of unfairness is facilitated by creation of a common meeting ground, which has come to be called the Internet. A nostalgic return to the good old days, which were never as good as remembered, is generally a lost cause. Society moves, and those who wish to maintain or gain ascendance in it must move as well. No matter the likelihood of successful regression to an earlier and idealized past, the felt need is real, and groups based on a search for a way back sometimes can have

powerful effects on contemporary society. Motivating and using nostalgia for a return to a simpler past, when all indicators point in the other direction, is the needed grist for the mill of the presumptive leaders of outsider affinity groups. Their success or failure is more a function of rhetoric than objective circumstances.

Persuasion Tactics in Affinity Group Formation and Maintenance

Irrespective of context and audience, the persuasive approach adopted by many budding affinity group leaders are remarkably similar. The approach takes advantage of the likelihood that potential converts to the cause are living in a state of relative deprivation, which gives rise to anger and a resultant sense of desperation – Something must be done (Smith et al., 2020). The audience's options appear extremely limited, involving some form of resistance or an acceptance of the continuing deterioration of their opportunities or the quality of their lives, with no apparent ways out of this unacceptable state of affairs. Psychologically, this possible future was as apparent to members of the desperately poor converts to the Peoples Temple as it was to the members of the Tea Party, whose prospects even after their own anticipated slide into obscurity were considerably more rosy than those of the Templers. The draw of the potential leader of the group offers himself (or herself) as the only person who can provide the audience a way out. A good example of this process was evident at the 2016 meeting of the Republican National Committee, where Donald Trump said, in an appeal for the nomination as his party's standard bearer, "Nobody knows the system better than me (sic)... which is why I alone can fix it."⁴ The offer of a solution to all their problems to an audience living in various degrees of desperation was not only hard to resist, but often accepted uncritically and enthusiastically, just as was Mr. Trump's promise of salvation.

⁴ See <https://www.politico.com/video/2020/08/20/trump-at-2016-rnc-i-alone-can-fix-it-085403>, and Leonnig and Rucker's (2021) book on the final year of the Trump presidency.

The importance of the leader being one of the group

The cost of salvation is an unwavering loyalty to the cause and not incidentally to its leader, so as not to undermine the savior who must maintain a sense of infallibility, of never being wrong, and of having the absolute loyalty of his minions. Leaders of aberrant groups must be part of the group they wish to lead. They might not come from the group, but that is not as important as the leader's ability to adopt their sense of outrage and use this presentational form to insinuate him- or herself as a group member in good standing. In modern political campaigns in the United States, for example, an almost mandatory picture of a clearly uncomfortable and often out-of-condition politico is shown dressed in denim and flannel awkwardly handling a pickax or shovel to show his allegiance and membership in the mythical organization of the "American working man." These pictures are almost always hilarious to those who know the politician, but they do signal a realization of the importance of the claim of identity with the afflicted group, and those from related groups also seeking salvation of one sort or another. Ingroup membership is fundamental, because without it, the prospective leader has no basis to claim the unfailing allegiance of the followers (Crano, 2012).

Once allegiance is ensured, leaders of aberrant groups must follow a series of prescribed behaviors that must be followed if the perception of near infallibility is to be maintained. These rules must consistently guide the behavior of both leader and follower and must be maintained largely by processes of communication and persuasion.

The communication directives

After becoming the prototypical member of the group, the unbreakable rule of the presumptive leader, the communication directives to be followed involve *persistence*, *consistency*, *unanimity*, and *flexibility*. In the group formation and development context,

persistence requires the leader never to retreat from a position and never to compromise with the “enemy” (i.e., the larger or majority group). Persistence is fundamental because in promoting compromise, the majority seeks to coopt or overwhelm the opposition leader’s authority. Even minor cooperative gestures by the leader reveal a weakness in the orthodoxy, opening the possibility of further concessions to the power of the majority, and a loss of authority of the smaller group’s leader. Thus, the nascent leader is required to adopt a “no compromise, no retreat” position, and via persuasion to promote the logic of group resistance. To do otherwise is to admit that others can offer a solution of the weaker group members’ problems that is perhaps more effective and efficiently delivered than is possible for the leader. Coopting and seeking minor concessions for a promised reward is a central feature of majority influence. It not only serves the purposes of the majority by weakening the legitimacy of the minority leader’s position, but also has the added advantage of never requiring the promised payment – at least not for long. The minority, having entered a “contract” with the majority, is in no position to demand the deal be kept. The majority rules.

In some cases, it seems obvious that the minority group leader has indeed cooperated with the majority, but this perception must not be left to stand. To the extent possible, the leader’s backtracking from the no compromise rule must be redefined as a win, a victory over those who would squeeze as much life out of the righteous as possible, always by nefarious means. The loss is not a loss, but a skillful turning of the tables on the power structure in which the minority comes out on top.

A parallel to the “never compromise” stance of the leader is the *unanimity* rule, which applies to the group’s members. The requirement of unanimity is inviolate. It requires the rank and file to be as resistant to the inducements of the majority as the leader. Even suggesting

compromise or giving in on small points is a sign of apostasy within the in-group minority, an abandonment of the faith. It must be condemned because it betrays a dangerous lack of commitment, a signal that alternatives to the core beliefs not only exist, but may even comport favorably with members' vested interests. Such compromises threaten the legitimacy of the leader, who is thus obliged to stamp out the dangerous possibility that rival explanations of minority group members' plight are possible, and perhaps even more supportable than the positions advanced by its leader.

In addition to the prescribed behaviors outlined to this point, the apparently inconsistent necessity for flexibility when dealing with outsiders also is a crucial feature of the minority leader. It was noted earlier that a minority group leader's concession must be framed as a victory. This strengthens faith in the leader's promise of near infallibility. It also is true that flexibility in dealing with the majority's demands also must be maintained, because otherwise, the formal power of the majority may appear justified when levied on the minority. *Flexibility* refers to the positioning of arguments in such a way that the minority's position is studiously maintained and its reasonableness emphasized while concurrently indicating the clear injustice of the majority's demands. Skilled leaders of fledgling affinity groups must possess this ability, or the members of their own groups may begin to wonder why the tempting inducements of the majority were not accepted.

The final determinant affecting the leader's persuasive capabilities considered here is concerned with followers' perception of the leader's singular focus on their followers' wellbeing. At times in the development of an affinity group on the rise, it will prove advantageous to couple with other groups that share some, if not all the major tenets of the leader's primary group. Leaders must be able to show how the alignment of one or more other groups whose positions

are largely consistent with that of the central group provides strength and reach that would not likely be realized if the central group went on its own way. Balancing intergroup interactions of this kind is fraught with potential difficulties, but its success can result in a considerably more influential than might otherwise be apparent if the components of the amalgamated group were considered separately. The tricky feature of this kind of interaction is that the leader must demonstrate that the original group has his allegiance, and the cooperating group adds strength while not detracting from the leader's major concern and attention on the betterment of the original group. This is a difficult position to maintain, but almost any political leader at the national level must perform in such a way that the audience infers undivided loyalty to their cause while simultaneously maintaining the implication that all supporting groups are, independently, his or her concern.

Conclusion

The development of close-knit affinity groups bears serious consideration in contexts of social unrest. Understating the factors giving rise to such groups is important because it allows a clear understanding of the causes of such geneses and the likely processes of growth and development that marks the likely evolution or dissolution of such groups. These processes are largely understood in terms of the literature on the development of minority groups and the factors that facilitate their success or failure, factors that influence the persuasiveness of out-group leaders, and the social identity features that play so prominent a role in the study of groups, established and newly formed. The processes have been outlined in earlier research on all there of these features of affinity group development, we believe this chapter has provide some insight into this important issue.

The added feature of the developing groups' influence on issues related, but not identical to the central core of the minority-majority dispute is not considered here, owing to special constraints involved in group formation and development, but it is important to mention. Generally, the majority is loath to consider a minority leader's demands, but often will give on points related to them. A demand for more fair tax laws may give rise to more economic opportunities offered the complaining groups. The process is one of co-option, but it is not clear if it is process that occurs automatically, as an almost evolutionary adaptation that serves the stability and longevity of groups, or a carefully considered aspect of intragroup persuasion designed to alleviate the concerns of the minority while simultaneously maintaining the integrity of the group. These issues are considered through this volume (see ???, this volume), and point to issues to be studied in developing a clearer understanding of the birthing, nurturing, and evolution of dystopian groups.

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